Amster Rothstein & Ebenstein, LLP - Intellectual Property Law http://www.arelaw.com/ Amster, Rothstein & Ebenstein is a well-established mid-sized legal firm engaged exclusively in the practice of intellectual property law, including patents, trademarks, copyrights, unfair competition and related matters. Since our inception in 1953, we have earned an impressive record of successes for our clients, from individuals to multinational corporations, both domestic and worldwide. These successes are borne of the vigorous application of legal expertise, innovation and objective analysis. en Tue, 25 Jun 2019 16:31:58 +0000 Floodlight Design CMS ARE Patent Law Alert:<br>SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS NOT A “PERSON” CAPABLE OF PETITIONING FOR INSTITUTION OF AIA REVIEW PROCEEDINGS<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert06102019/ Messrs. Macedo and Goldberg represented amicus curiae New York Intellectual Property Law Association in this case at the Supreme Court.Messrs. Macedo and Goldberg represented amicus curiae New York Intellectual Property Law Association in this case at the Supreme Court.S. Supreme Court delivered an opinion in <i>Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service</i>, No. 17-1594, slip op. (U.S. June 10, 2019), addressing the question of whether the government is a &ldquo;person&rdquo; who may petition to institute review proceedings under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (&ldquo;AIA&rdquo;).&nbsp; In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that the U.S. Government is not a &ldquo;person&rdquo; capable of petitioning for institution of AIA review proceedings. &nbsp;Slip op. at 17-18.<br /><br /><div style="margin-bottom:12.0pt">In the proceedings below, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (&ldquo;PTAB&rdquo;) issued a final written decision in a Covered Business Method patent review (&ldquo;CBM&rdquo;) proceeding brought by the U.S. Postal Service (&ldquo;Postal Service&rdquo;) as a petitioner, invalidating certain claims of a patent owned (and asserted in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims) by Return Mail, Inc.&nbsp; USPS is a &ldquo;government entity&rdquo; as recognized in <i>United States Postal Serv. v. Flamingo Indus. (USA) Ltd.</i>, 540 U.S. 736, 748 (2004). &nbsp;The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (&ldquo;Federal Circuit&rdquo;) affirmed the PTAB&rsquo;s holding that the Postal Service has standing to file a petition to institute a CBM proceeding.&nbsp; The U.S. Supreme Court then granted Return Mail&rsquo;s petition for a writ of certiorari on the question of whether the government is a &ldquo;person&rdquo; who may petition to institute review proceedings under the AIA.</div> <div>The New York Intellectual Property Law Association (&ldquo;NYIPLA&rdquo;), represented by Amster, Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein, LLP and others submitted an amicus brief to the Supreme Court in support of neither party. While the NYIPLA took no position as to the ultimate merits of Petitioner Return Mail&rsquo;s underlying position, i.e., whether the government is a &ldquo;person&rdquo; who may petition to institute a CBM proceeding under AIA &sect; 18(a)(1)(B), the NYIPLA argued that it strongly believes that the Court should carefully consider the potential implications of interpreting &ldquo;person&rdquo; in Title 35 of the U.S. Code (&ldquo;Patent Act&rdquo;) and the AIA as including or excluding the government generally, and then issue only a narrow holding on the scope of &ldquo;person&rdquo; under AIA &sect; 18(a)(1)(B) and, if at all, under 35 U.S.C. &sect;&sect; 311(a) and 321(a). (See Brief for Amicus Curiae NYIPLA in Support of Neither Party, Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service et al., No. 17-1594, (U.S. Dec. 17, 2018) (<a href="https://www.arelaw.com/images/file/17-1594%20ac%20NY%20Intellectual%20Property%20Law%20Association.pdf" target="_blank">https://www.arelaw.com/images/file/17-1594%20ac%20NY%20Intellectual%20Property%20Law%20Association.pdf</a>)).<br />&nbsp;</div> <div style="margin-bottom:12.0pt">Justice Sotomayor (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh) wrote the majority opinion of the Court.&nbsp; Justice Sotomayor&rsquo;s opinion notes that the relevant patent statutes do not define the term &ldquo;person,&rdquo; thus weighing in favor of a long-standing presumption against including the sovereign within that term in a way that reflects the term&rsquo;s common usage. &nbsp;Slip op. at 6-7.&nbsp; The opinion points out that courts have used the definition of &ldquo;person&rdquo; that is laid out by the Dictionary Act, unless the context indicates otherwise, and that the definition of &ldquo;person&rdquo; includes many entities but not the federal government.<i>&nbsp; Id. </i>at 7-9.</div> <div style="margin-bottom:12.0pt">The majority also addressed the Postal Service&rsquo;s arguments that the context of the AIA itself indicates intent to include the government as a &ldquo;person.&rdquo; &nbsp;The Postal Service argued that the AIA&rsquo;s reference to a &ldquo;person&rdquo; in the context of post-issuance review proceedings must include the government because other references to persons in the patent statutes appear to do so. &nbsp;<i>Id.</i> at 9-10.&nbsp; While the majority opinion noted that words used by Congress in one part of a statute often have the same meaning elsewhere in the same statute, there are at least 18 references to &ldquo;person&rdquo; throughout the Patent Act with no clear trend shown.&nbsp; Some of the references include the government, others exclude the government, and others could be read either way.&nbsp; <i>Id.</i> at 10.</div> <div style="margin-bottom:12.0pt">The Postal Service cited to 35 U.S.C. &sect; 207(a)(1), which authorizes federal agencies to obtain patents, as a sufficient contextual clue that &ldquo;person&rdquo; as is referred to within the statute governing the patent application process must include federal agencies. &nbsp;<i>Id. </i>at 10.&nbsp; However, Justice Sotomayor wrote that Section 207 &ldquo;implies nothing about what a federal agency may or may not do following the issuance of someone else&rsquo;s patent.&rdquo; <i>Id.</i> at 11.</div> <div style="margin-bottom:12.0pt">The Postal Service then pointed to the USPTO&rsquo;s Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP).&nbsp; <i>Id. </i>at 13.&nbsp; Specifically, the MPEP has considered federal agencies to be &ldquo;persons&rdquo; capable of requesting<i> ex parte</i> reexamination at USPTO since 1981. &nbsp;<i>Id.</i>&nbsp; However, the Court&rsquo;s majority held that this has no direct relevance on the case here because an <i>ex parte</i> reexamination, a proceeding handled internally within the USPTO, and AIA validity trials, which are adversarial, adjudicatory proceedings handled between parties, are meaningfully different. <i>Id.</i> at 14-15.</div> <div style="margin-bottom:12.0pt">Finally, the Postal Service argued that it must be a &ldquo;person&rdquo; who may petition for AIA review proceedings because, like other potential infringers, it is subject to civil liability and can assert a defense of patent invalidity. &nbsp;<i>Id.</i> at 15-16.&nbsp; However, the Court noted that &ldquo;the Postal Service overstates the asymmetry.&rdquo; &nbsp;<i>Id.</i> at 15.&nbsp; Non-governmental actors might face injunctions, a jury trial, or punitive damages for their infringement while government agencies only have to provide &ldquo;reasonable and entire compensation.&rdquo; &nbsp;<i>Id.</i> at 16.&nbsp; The majority held that &ldquo;[b]ecause federal agencies face lower risks, it is reasonable for Congress to have treated them differently.&rdquo;&nbsp; <i>Id.</i>&nbsp; Furthermore, excluding federal agencies from AIA review avoids the &ldquo;awkward situation&rdquo; that would follow if a civilian patent owner had to face a validity challenge from a federal agency in a proceeding overseen by a different federal agency.&nbsp; <i>Id.</i> at 17.</div> <div style="margin-bottom:12.0pt">In a separate opinion, Justice Breyer (joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan) dissented the Court&rsquo;s majority opinion.&nbsp; <i>Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service</i>, No. 17-1594, slip op. (U.S. June 10, 2019) (Breyer, J., dissenting). &nbsp;The dissent argued that the factors regarding congressional intent on the definition of &ldquo;person&rdquo; weighed against the Court&rsquo;s traditional presumption excluding the sovereign from that definition. &nbsp;Justice Breyer agreed with the Postal Service that Section 207(a)(1)&rsquo;s authorization of federal agencies to obtain patents led to &ldquo;no dispute&rdquo; that the word &ldquo;person&rdquo; in the patent-eligibility provisions must include the government.&nbsp; <i>Id. </i>at 3.</div> <div style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="color: rgb(51, 51, 51); background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">We expect that related issues will likely arise soon, and will continue to monitor the PTAB, Federal Circuit, and Supreme Court for the latest developments in the interpretation of the AIA.&nbsp; In the meantime, should you have any questions, please feel free to contact one of our lawyers.</span></div> <div style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">&nbsp;</div> <div><span style="color: rgb(51, 51, 51); background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">*Charles R. Macedo is a Partner, and&nbsp;</span>David P. Goldberg and Christopher Lisiewski<span style="color: rgb(51, 51, 51); background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"> are Associates at Amster Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP. Their practice specializes in intellectual property issues, including litigating patent, trademark and other intellectual property disputes. </span>The authors may be reached at cmacedo@arelaw.com, dgoldberg@arelaw.com, and clisiewski@arelaw.com.<br /><span style="font-size:12.0pt;Times New Roman"><br /></span>Messrs. Macedo and Goldberg represented amicus curiae New York Intellectual Property Law Association in this case at the Supreme Court.</div> Mon, 10 Jun 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert06102019/ AR&E TRADEMARK LAW ALERT: SUPREME COURT HOLDS TRADEMARK LICENSE CANNOT BE RESCINDED IN BANKRUPTCY IN MISSION PRODUCT HOLDINGS INC. V. TEMPNOLOGY, LLC http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert05222019/ <span style="text-indent: 0.5in;"><span id="1558625635057S" style="display: none;">&nbsp;</span><span id="1558625634921S" style="display: none;">&nbsp;</span><span id="1558625635138S" style="display: none;">&nbsp;</span><span id="1558625634397S" style="display: none;">&nbsp;</span>&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; (May 22, 2019), On May 20, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court strengthened trademark licenses by holding that a bankrupt debtor&rsquo;s right to reject certain contracts under Section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code does not permit the debtor to rescind trademark licenses. <em>See Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC</em>, 587 U.S. __ (2019).&nbsp;</span><div style="text-indent:.5in">&nbsp;</div> <div style="text-indent:.5in">The Court ruled in favor of trademark licensee Mission Product Holdings Inc., which had a license from clothing designer Tempnology. When Tempnology filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, it sought to rescind its license to Mission.&nbsp; Mission objected under Section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code, which stated that a &ldquo;licensee of a right to intellectual property&rdquo; could choose to retain its licensed rights, so long as it was not in breach (e.g., paying its Royalty obligations). Tempnology argued that &ldquo;intellectual property&rdquo; was defined in the Bankruptcy Code to include trade secrets, patents, and copyrights, but it did not include &ldquo;trademarks.&rdquo;&nbsp; The Bankruptcy Court ruled with Tempnology, and extinguished the license. <i>In re Tempnology, LLC</i>, 541 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2015).</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed the decision relying on the decision in <i>Sunbeam Products, Inc. </i>v. <i>Chicago A. Mfg., LLC</i>, 686 F. 3d 372, 376&ndash;377 (7th Cir. 2012). The Panel focused heavily on the statement in Section 365(g) that rejection of a contract &ldquo;constitutes a breach.&rdquo; Therefore, while a rejection converts a debtor&rsquo;s unfulfilled obligations to a pre-petition damages claim, it does not terminate the contract or extinguish the licensee&rsquo;s rights. <i>Mission Products Holdings, Inc. </i>v. <i>Tempnology, LLC</i>, 589 B.R. 809 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016).</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit then rejected the Appellate Panel&rsquo;s view, and reinstated the lower court decision, reasoning that the trademark owner&rsquo;s inability to monitor and exercise quality control over goods associated with the mark jeopardizes the continued validity of its own rights. <i>Mission Products Holdings, Inc. </i>v. <i>Tempnology, LLC</i>, 879 F.3d 389 (1st Cir. 2018).</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the question of whether a rejection has the same consequences as a contract breach, or if the rejection terminates the entire agreement, effectively rescinding the contract altogether. The Supreme Court took the former view and reversed the First Circuit, agreeing with the Seventh Circuit&rsquo;s rejection-as-breach approach. The decision effectively gives each party distinct options, similar to those in typical breach of contract cases. The debtor-licensor, upon filing for bankruptcy, may choose to continue its contracts or reject its obligations, repudiating any further performance of its duties. The licensee may keep up its side of the agreement, continuing to pay for the use of the trademark while also having the opportunity to seek damages for the breach. The licensee may also choose to walk away from the agreement and sue for the resulting damages. The termination of the trademark license is entirely at the hands of the licensee. <i>Mission Product Holdings, Inc.</i> v. <i>Tempnology, LLC</i>, 587 U.S. __ (2019).&nbsp;</div> <div>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</div> <div style="text-indent:.5in">The Court explained that the rejection-as-breach rule ensures that a debtor is subject to its counterparty&rsquo;s contractual rights even after the bankruptcy petition is filed. The rule prevents a debtor in bankruptcy from recapturing interests it had given up through contract. In its rejection of Tempnology&rsquo;s argument that trademarks were specifically left out of Section 365, the Court pointed out that Congress has enacted the provisions in that section when needed to enforce or clarify the general rule that contractual rights survive rejection. For example, following the Fourth Circuit&rsquo;s decision in <i>Lubrizol Enterprises </i>v. <i>Richmond Metal Finishers</i>, 756 F. 2d 1043 (1985)to adopt the same rule for patent licenses that the First Circuit erroneously applied in this case, Congress sprang into action to enact Section 365(n). This section reversed <i>Lubrizol</i> and ensured the continuation of patent licensees&rsquo; rights.</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Ultimately, the Court declined to distinguish trademarks from other types of intellectual property licenses covered under Section 365. &nbsp;The implications for trademark law are significant.&nbsp; Parties contemplating reliance on a licensed mark for building a business will now have more comfort that their rights will not be pulled by an unexpected bankruptcy by the licensor.&nbsp;</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; However the Court left certain important questions unanswered though, which may be presented in future cases.&nbsp; For example, if the bankrupt licensor no longer provides actual control over the nature and the quality of the use by the licensee, the Court did not address whether the result may invalidate the trademark under the rules against &ldquo;naked licensing.&rdquo;&nbsp; Future trademark licenses should include detailed provisions attempting to address issues such as this.</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; We will continue to follow developments in the law of trademark licensing as it applies to bankruptcy. In the meantime, should you have any questions, please feel free to contact one of our lawyers.</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> * Mr. Rothstein is a partner and Mr. Garrity is a Law Clerk at Amster, Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP. They be reached at crothstein@arelaw.com and dgarrity@arelaw.com.<br /> Wed, 22 May 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert05222019/ Brief of Amicus Curiae NYIPLA in Support of Petitioner http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/amicus05162019/ <a href="https://www.nyipla.org/NewsBot.asp?MODE=VIEW&amp;ID=27902" target="_blank">NYIPLA Urges Supreme Court to Clarify the Definition of &ldquo;Expenses&rdquo; in Lanham Act</a>.<br /><br />On Thursday, May 16, 2019, the New York Intellectual Property Law Association (&ldquo;NYIPLA&rdquo;) filed an amicus brief in support of a petition for a writ of certiorari by Booking.com B.V. urging the Supreme Court to decide whether a trademark applicant must pay the United States Patent and Trademark Office&rsquo;s (&ldquo;PTO&rdquo;) attorneys&rsquo; fees as &ldquo;expenses in United States district court appeals pursuant to 15 U.S.C. &sect; 1071 (b)(3). The NYIPLA takes the position that the Supreme Court should grant certiorari in this case and consolidate it with Peter v. Nantkwest, No. 18-801 under Rules of the Supreme Court 27. <br /> <br />In support, the NYIPLA argued that Booking.com raises the same issue as NantKwest, but challenges the statutory definition of &ldquo;expenses&rdquo; for the Trademark Act (15 U.S.C.) instead of the Patent Act (35 U.S.C.) [&hellip;]<br /><br />Click to download pdf:&nbsp;<a href="/images/file/18-1309%20Motion%20For%20Leave%20To%20File%20Amicus%20Curiae%20Brief%20and%20Brief%20of%20New%20York%20Intellectual%20Property%20Law%20Association%20As%20Amicus%20Curiae%20In%20Support%20of%20Petitioner.pdf" target="_blank">Motion For Leave To File Amicus Curiae Brief and Brief of New York Intellectual Property Law Association As Amicus Curiae In Support of Petitioner</a><br type="_moz" /> Thu, 16 May 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/amicus05162019/ Practical Law:<br>Understanding PTAB Trials: Key Milestones in IPR, PGR, and CBM Proceedings<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/practicallaw05142019/ <strong>REVISED&nbsp; May 14, 2019 --&nbsp;<a href="/images/file/20190514%20Understanding%20PTAB%20Trials%20Key%20Milestones%20in%20IPR%20PGR%20and%20CBM%20Proceeding.pdf" target="_blank">Understanding PTAB Trials: Key Milestones in IPR, PGR, and CBM Proceedings</a></strong> Tue, 14 May 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/practicallaw05142019/ Iancu v. NantKwest, Inc.<br>USPTO Expenses And Attorneys’ Fees Under Section 145<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/05022019presentation/ <a href="/images/file/2019%20JPPCLE%20-%20Presentation.pdf" target="_blank">USPTO Expenses And Attorneys&rsquo; Fees Under Section 145</a> Thu, 02 May 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/05022019presentation/ Nasdaq Opening Bell – Cornell Blockchain Event http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert04112019/ Congratulations to Cornell Blockchain on ringing the bell on April 11, 2019 at NASDAQ. Amster, Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP is proud to be a sponsor of the Cornell Blockchain Conference.<br /><br />For more information please see&nbsp;<a href="https://business.nasdaq.com/discover/market-bell-ceremonies/detail.html#!/!?ceremonyId=8574" target="_blank">business.nasdaq.com/discover/market-bell-ceremonies/detail.html#!/!<br /><br /><img src="/images/image/CRM-Nasdaq.jpeg" width="300" height="568" alt="" /><br type="_moz" /></a> Thu, 11 Apr 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert04112019/ ARE Patent Law Alert:<br>Federal Circuit Finds Method of Treatment Claims Patent-Eligible, Not Directed to Natural Law<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert04012019/ On March 28, 2019, the Federal Circuit issued a unanimous 3-0 decision finding claims covering a method of treatment&mdash;namely, treating pain in renally impaired patients using the opioid oxymorphone&mdash;to be patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. &sect; 101.&nbsp; This decision in <i>Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.</i>, No. 17-1240 overturned the district court&rsquo;s holding that the claims were merely directed to the natural law that the effective dose of oxymorphone is lower in patients with renal impairment because the bioavailability of oxymorphone is increased in such patients.<div style="margin-bottom:12.0pt">The Federal Circuit rejected the district court&rsquo;s conclusion at step one of the two-part <i>Alice</i>/<i>Mayo </i>test, finding that the claims were not &ldquo;directed to&rdquo; a natural law, but to &ldquo;a method of using oxymorphone . . . to treat pain in a renally impaired patient.&rdquo;&nbsp; The Federal Circuit came to this conclusion based on the specification and the claim language of the following &ldquo;representative&rdquo; claim:</div> <div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:6.0pt;&#10;margin-left:.5in"><span style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">1. A method of treating pain in a renally impaired patient, comprising the steps of: </span></div> <div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:6.0pt;&#10;margin-left:.5in"><span style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">a. providing a solid oral controlled release dosage form, comprising: </span></div> <div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:6.0pt;&#10;margin-left:.75in"><span style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">i. about 5 mg to about 80 mg of oxymorphone or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof as the sole active ingredient; and </span></div> <div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:6.0pt;&#10;margin-left:.75in"><span style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">ii. a controlled release matrix;</span></div> <div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:6.0pt;&#10;margin-left:.5in"><span style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">b. measuring a creatinine clearance rate of the patient and determining it to be </span></div> <div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:6.0pt;&#10;margin-left:.75in"><span style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">(a) less than about 30 ml/min, </span></div> <div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:6.0pt;&#10;margin-left:.75in"><span style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">(b) about 30 mL/min to about 50 mL/min, </span></div> <div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:6.0pt;&#10;margin-left:.75in"><span style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">(c) about 51 mL/min to about 80 mL/min, or </span></div> <div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:6.0pt;&#10;margin-left:.75in"><span style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">(d) above about 80 mL/min; and </span></div> <div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:6.0pt;&#10;margin-left:.5in"><span style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">c. orally administering to said patient, in dependence on which creatinine clearance rate is found, a lower dosage of the dosage form to provide pain relief; </span></div> <div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:12.0pt;&#10;margin-left:.5in"><span style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">wherein after said administration to said patient, the average AUC of oxymorphone over a 12-hour period is less than about 21 ng&middot;hr/mL.</span></div> <div style="margin-bottom:12.0pt">The Federal Circuit compared this claim to the claims it found patent-eligible last year in <i>Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. West-Ward Pharmaceuticals International Ltd</i>, 887 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018).&nbsp; Our previous report on the <i>Vanda </i>decision can be found <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert042018/" target="_blank"><span style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">here</span></a>.&nbsp; The Federal Circuit found the <i>Endo</i> claim here &ldquo;legally indistinguishable from the representative claim in <i>Vanda</i>&rdquo; since &ldquo;[b]oth claims recite a method for treating a patient&rdquo; using a dosage regimen based on patient testing.&nbsp; Accordingly, the Federal Circuit repeated its finding from <i>Vanda </i>and found that both claims &ldquo;are directed to a specific method of treatment for specific patients using a specific compound at specific doses to achieve a specific outcome.&rdquo;&nbsp;</div> <div style="margin-bottom:12.0pt">The Federal Circuit also distinguished the <i>Endo </i>claims from those found patent-ineligible in <i>Mayo </i>for the same reasons as those stated in <i>Vanda</i>.&nbsp; For example, the Court found that the <i>Endo </i>claims &ldquo;recite the steps of carrying out a dosage regimen based on the results of kidney function testing&rdquo; in contrast to the non-specific claims in <i>Mayo </i>whose testing steps &ldquo;&lsquo;indicat[ed]&rsquo; a need to increase or decrease dosage, without prescribing a specific dosage regimen or other added steps to take as a result of that indication.&rdquo;</div> <div style="margin-bottom:12.0pt">The Federal Circuit&rsquo;s <i>Vanda </i>decision is currently the subject of a pending cert petition, in which the &ldquo;Question Presented&rdquo; by the Petitioners is &ldquo;whether patents that claim a method of medically treating a patient automatically satisfy Section 101 of the Patent Act, even if they apply a natural law using only routine and conventional steps.&rdquo;&nbsp; On March 15, 2019, the Petitioners brought the Federal Circuit&rsquo;s decision in <i>Natural Alternatives Int'l, Inc. v. Creative Compounds, LLC</i>, No. 18-1295 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 15, 2019) to the attention of the Supreme Court, since it similarly found method of treatment claims to be patent-eligible.&nbsp; (Both <i>Vanda </i>and <i>Natural Alternatives </i>were split 2-1 decisions of the Federal Circuit.)&nbsp; On March 18, 2019, the Solicitor General was invited to file briefs with regard to the <i>Vanda</i> petition.</div> <div style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">We will continue to follow developments in the above cases and the law of patent-eligibility. In the meantime, should you have any questions, please feel free to contact one of our lawyers.<br /><br />*<a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/cmacedo/" target="_blank">Charles R. Macedo</a>, M.S. is a Partner, <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/amiller/" target="_blank">Alan D. Miller, Ph.D.</a> is a Senior Counsel, and <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/bamos/" target="_blank">Brian Amos, Ph.D.</a> and <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/shudak/" target="_blank">Sandra A. Hudak</a> are Associates at Amster Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP. Their practice specializes in intellectual property issues, including litigating patent, trademark and other intellectual property disputes. The authors may be reached at cmacedo@arelaw.com, amiller@arelaw.com, bamos@arelaw.com, and shudak@arelaw.com.</div><p>&nbsp;</p> Mon, 01 Apr 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert04012019/ ARE Copyright Law Alert:<br>Supreme Court Resolves Two Circuit Splits Impacting Copyright Litigation in Fourth Estate v. WallStreet.Com and Rimini v. Oracle<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert03062019/ (March 6, 2019). On March 4, 2019, the United States Supreme Court issued two decisions which resolved circuit court splits impacting when copyright infringement cases may be brought and what costs may be recovered when completed.<br /><br />In <em>Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp v. WallStreet.Com, LLC</em> (No. 15-571), the Court held that a claimant cannot file suit for copyright infringement prior to the Copyright Office <u>acting</u> <u>on</u> the application to register. In other words, merely filing an application before commencing a copyright infringement suit is not enough. Rather, the Copyright Office must either issue the Registration or reject the application before a copyright infringement lawsuit may be brought in court. <em>Fourth Estate</em> repudiated the expansive approach that had been adopted by the Ninth Circuit, which permitted a copyright infringement lawsuit to proceed immediately after a copyright application had been filed &mdash; even if it had not been acted upon by the Copyright office. The <em>Fourth Estate</em> decision will have clear implications on the timing and commencement of copyright infringement suits. The losing side had argued unfairness to artists and authors. With respect to resulting damages, the court noted that upon registration a copyright owner can recover for infringement that occurred both before and after the registration. In addition, the copyright owner may still seek an injunction to prevent continued infringement. The copyright office offers expedited procedures for a fee which allows for quicker registration as a mechanism to offset some of the harsher consequences of the <em>Fourth Estate</em> decision.<br /><br />In <em>Rimini Street Inc. et al. v. Oracle USA Inc.</em> (No. 17-1625), the Court addressed the issue of what constitutes &ldquo;full costs&rdquo; under the Copyright Act. Section 505 of the Act states that courts may issue a discretionary award of &ldquo;full costs&rdquo; to any party. The Court concluded that &quot;full costs&quot; do <u>not</u> include major litigation costs such as those for e-discovery vendors and experts, thereby eliminating the Ninth Circuit&rsquo;s more expansive interpretation of the term. This narrow interpretation could affect the calculus of litigants as to whether or not to take a copyright case to trial when an award of costs is a significant portion of the likely ultimate recovery, with some arguing that the conclusion will place an undue burden on individuals and smaller companies with limited resources.<br /><br />To learn more how these decisions may impact your copyrighted work, please feel free to contact the authors.<br /><br />Charles R. Macedo, Chester Rothstein and Doug Miro are partners and Marc Jason is a senior counsel at Amster, Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP. They can be reached at <a href="mailto:cmacedo@arelaw.com">cmacedo@arelaw.com</a>, <a href="mailto:crothstein@arelaw.com">crothstein@arelaw.com</a>, <a href="mailto:dmiro@arelaw.com">dmiro@arelaw.com</a> and <a href="mailto:mjason@arelaw.com">mjason@arelaw.com</a>, respectively. Wed, 06 Mar 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert03062019/ ARE PTO & PTAB Alert:<br>PTO Updates Guidelines Concerning Examining Computer-Implemented Functional Claim Limitations<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert02152019/ <span style="text-align: justify;">(February 15, 2019)&nbsp; On January 7, 2019, the USPTO issued its latest guidance on Computer Implemented Functional Claim Limitations. &nbsp;2019 Examining Computer-Implemented Functional Claim Limitations for Compliance With 35 U.S.C. &sect; 112, USPTO, 84 Fed. Reg. 57 (Jan. 7, 2019),</span><i style="text-align: justify;"> available at</i><span style="text-align: justify;">, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-01-07/pdf/2018-28283.pdf (&ldquo;the 2019 Guidelines&rdquo;). &nbsp;The 2019 Guidelines, which do not fundamentally change the current framework for analyzing means-plus-function claims, are meant to &ldquo;assist [USPTO] personnel in the examination of claims in patent applications where functional language is used to claim computer-implemented inventions.&rdquo;&nbsp;</span><div style="text-align:justify">&nbsp;</div> <div style="text-align:justify">The 2019 Guidelines have two parts.&nbsp; The first part &ldquo;addresses issues related to the examination of computer-implemented functional claims having means-plus-function limitations&rdquo; (issues related to means (or step) plus function limitations under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) and definiteness under 35 U.S.C. 112(b)).&nbsp; The second part &ldquo;addresses written description and enablement issues related to the examination of computer-implemented functional claims that recite only the idea of a solution or outcome of a problem, but fail to recite details of how the solution or outcome is accomplished&rdquo; (issues related to proper written description and enablement support under 35 U.S.C. 112(a)).</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div align="center" style="margin-bottom:6.0pt;text-align:center"><b><u>Part I</u></b></div> <div style="text-align:justify">The first part of the 2019 Guidelines requires Examiners to determine whether to apply 35 U.S.C. &sect; 112(f) by first determining the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim consistent with the specification and one of ordinary skill in the art.&nbsp; Examiners are then asked to implement the following three-pronged test:</div> <div style="text-align:justify">&nbsp;</div> <div style="margin-left:.75in;&#10;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.25in;"><div>1.<span style="white-space:pre"> </span>Determine whether the claim uses the term &ldquo;means&rdquo; or &ldquo;step&rdquo; or another generic placeholder;</div><div>2.<span style="white-space:pre"> </span>Determine whether the claim term is modified by functional language; and</div><div>3.<span style="white-space:pre"> </span>Determine whether the claim term is modified by sufficient disclosure, material, or acts for performing the function</div></div> <div style="text-align:justify">&nbsp;</div> <div style="text-align:justify">Any of the prongs and/or required structure analysis can cause an examiner to apply an analysis under 35 U.S.C. &sect; 112(f) (e.g., if a claim uses the term &ldquo;means,&rdquo; the examiner may employ an analysis under 35 U.S.C. &sect; 112(f); if the specification provides a description sufficient to inform one of ordinary skill in the art that the term or phrase denotes structure, then the examiner may determine an analysis under 35 U.S.C. &sect; 112(f) is unnecessary).&nbsp; With respect to the third prong, to determine whether a claim term or phrase coupled with a function denotes a structure, examiners are required to analyze whether:</div> <div style="text-align:justify">&nbsp;</div> <div style="margin-left:1.0in;&#10;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.25in;"><div>(a)<span style="white-space:pre"> </span>the specification provides a description sufficient to inform one of ordinary skill in the art that the term or phrase denotes structure;&nbsp;</div><div>(b)<span style="white-space:pre"> </span>general and/or subject matter dictionaries provide evidence that the term or phrase is recognized as a noun denoting structure; and&nbsp;</div><div>(c)<span style="white-space:pre"> </span>the prior art evidences that the term or phrase is recognized in the art as a structure to perform the claimed function.</div></div> <div style="margin-left:1.0in;&#10;text-align:justify">&nbsp;</div> <div style="text-align:justify">If the examiner determines that the claim at issue is to be analyzed under 35 U.S.C. &sect; 112(f), the new guidelines require this be expressly stated in the Office Action.&nbsp; In response to the Office Action which states the claims are being analyzed under 35 U.S.C. &sect; 112(f), the applicant, if he or she wishes to argue that 35 U.S.C. &sect; 112(f) should not be used, must either present a sufficient showing to establish that the claim limitation recites sufficient structure, or amend the claim limitation.</div> <div style="text-align:justify">&nbsp;</div> <div style="text-align:justify">With regard to computer functions analyzed under 35 U.S.C. &sect; 112(f), the guidelines require the specification to disclose an algorithm for performing the claimed function.&nbsp; Failure to do so will result in an indefiniteness rejection under 35 U.S.C. &sect; 112(b).&nbsp; An algorithm is defined as a &ldquo;finite sequence of steps for solving a logical or mathematical problem or performing a task.&rdquo;&nbsp; The new guidelines require the algorithm to be sufficient to perform the entire claimed function. &nbsp;Mathematical formulas,&nbsp; prose, a flow chart, or any understandable terms may be employed to satisfy the new algorithm requirement.&nbsp;</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div align="center" style="margin-bottom:6.0pt;text-align:center"><b><u>Part II</u></b></div> <div style="text-align:justify">&nbsp;</div> <div style="text-align:justify">The 2019 Guidelines emphasize that 35 U.S.C. &sect; 112(a) requires a disclosure to satisfy both the written description requirement and the enablement requirement, regardless of whether an Examiner reviews the claim term or phrase under 35 U.S.C. &sect; 112(f).</div> <div style="text-align:justify">&nbsp;</div> <div style="text-align:justify">With respect to the written description requirement, Examiners are to determine whether the scope of enablement is commensurate with the scope of protection sought by the claims.&nbsp; Thus, when examining computer-implemented, software-related claims, the 2019 Guidelines make it clear that Examiners &ldquo;should determine whether the specification discloses the computer and the algorithm(s) that achieve the claimed function in sufficient detail that one of ordinary skill in the art can reasonably conclude that the inventor possessed the claimed subject matter at the time of filing.&rdquo;</div> <div style="text-align:justify">&nbsp;</div> <div style="text-align:justify">With respect to the enablement requirement, the new guidelines state that Examiners &ldquo;should consider (1) how broad the claim is with respect to the disclosure and (2) whether one skilled in the art could make and use the entire scope of the claimed invention without undue experimentation.&rdquo;&nbsp; It is important to note here that the new guidelines also make it clear that &ldquo;the high level of skill in the art and the similarly high level of predictability in generating programs to achieve an intended result without undue experimentation&rdquo; may obviate the need to disclose aspects of an invention that are not considered novel (i.e., aspects that are generally well known in the art) in order to meet the enablement requirement.</div> <div style="text-align:justify">&nbsp;</div> <div style="text-align:justify">The USPTO is accepting written comments from the public regarding the 35 U.S.C. &sect;112(f)&nbsp;guidelines until March 8, 2019.</div> <div style="text-align:justify">&nbsp;</div> <div style="text-align:justify">For more information on patent office practice, please feel free to contact one of our attorneys.</div> <div style="text-align:justify">&nbsp;</div> * Charles R. Macedo Benjamin M. Halpern are partners, and Keith Barkaus and Michael Jones are associates at Amster Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP. Their practice specializes in intellectual property issues. They may be reached at cmacedo@arelaw.com, bhalpern@arelaw.com,kbarkaus@arelaw.com, and mjones@arelaw.com.<br /> Fri, 15 Feb 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert02152019/ ARE PTO & PTAB Alert:<br>PTO Updates Guidelines Concerning Subject Matter Eligibility<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert02082019/ February 8, 2019)&nbsp;On January 7, 2019, the USPTO issued its latest guidance on patent-eligibility.&nbsp;2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, USPTO, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019), <i>available at</i>, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-01-07/pdf/2018-28282.pdf (&ldquo;the 2019 Guidance&rdquo;).&nbsp;The 2019 Guidance explains that the USPTO is revising its examination procedure with respect to step one of the Alice test (referred to as Step 2A in USPTO guidance) to address public concerns and requests for &ldquo;increase[d] clarity and consistency in how Section 101 is currently applied.&rdquo;<div>&nbsp;</div> <div style="line-height:normal">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; The 2019 Guidance says that it is revising the prior USPTO guidance by &ldquo;(1) Providing groupings of subject matter that is considered an abstract idea; and (2) clarifying that a claim is not &lsquo;&lsquo;directed to&rsquo;&rsquo; a judicial exception if the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception.&quot;<sup>1</sup></div> <div style="line-height:normal"><br />&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; With respect to the first change made by the 2019 Guidance, the USPTO explains that it is making the change because the previous practice of &ldquo;compar[ing] claims at issue to those claims already found to be directed to an abstract idea in previous cases&rdquo; &ldquo;has since become impractical&rdquo; in view of the &ldquo;growing body of precedent&rdquo; on patent-eligibility at the Federal Circuit.&nbsp;The 2019 Guidance thus identifies the following enumerated groupings of abstract ideas, to be used in analyzing patent-eligibility at step one of the <i>Alice </i>test:</div> <div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom:12.0pt;&#10;margin-left:.5in;text-indent:0in;line-height:normal"><br />(a) <b>Mathematical concepts</b>&mdash;mathematical relationships, mathematical formulas or equations, mathematical calculations;</div> <div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom:12.0pt;&#10;margin-left:.5in;text-indent:0in;line-height:normal">(b) <b>Certain methods of organizing human activity</b>&mdash;fundamental economic principles or practices (including hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations); managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions); and</div> <div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom:12.0pt;&#10;margin-left:.5in;text-indent:0in;line-height:normal">(c) <b>Mental processes</b>&mdash;concepts performed in the human mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion).</div> <div style="line-height:normal">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Under the 2019 Guidance, these groupings define the full scope of abstract ideas at step one, except for in &ldquo;the rare circumstance in which a USPTO employee believes a claim limitation that does not fall within the enumerated groupings of abstract ideas should nonetheless be treated as reciting an abstract idea.&rdquo;&nbsp;In that &ldquo;rare circumstance,&rdquo; the Technology Center Director must approve any rejection and &ldquo;must provide a justification for why such claim limitation is being treated as reciting an abstract idea.&rdquo;<br />&nbsp;</div> <div style="line-height:normal">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; With respect to the second change made by the 2019 Guidance, the <i>Alice </i>step one test is now broken into two prongs under USPTO examination guidance.&nbsp;Examiners will first determine whether a claim recites an abstract idea by<br />&nbsp;</div> <div style="line-height:normal">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; (a) &ldquo;[i]dentify[ing] the specific limitation(s) in the claim under examination (individually or in combination) that the examiner believes recites an abstract idea; and</div> <div style="line-height:normal"><span style="white-space:pre"> <br /></span>&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; (b) determine whether the identified limitation(s) falls within the subject matter groupings of abstract ideas&rdquo; listed above.<br /><br />&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; In the second prong of <i>Alice </i>step one (i.e., Step 2A), &ldquo;examiners should evaluate whether the claim as a whole integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical application of the exception.&rdquo; The 2019 Guidance explains:</div> <div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom:12.0pt;&#10;margin-left:.5in;text-indent:0in;line-height:normal"><br />A claim that integrates a judicial exception into a practical application will apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a <b><i>meaningful limit on the judicial exception</i></b>, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.</div> <div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom:12.0pt;&#10;margin-left:.5in;text-indent:0in;line-height:normal">. . . Examiners evaluate integration into a practical application by: (a) Identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s); and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application, using one or more of the considerations laid out by the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit . . . .</div> <div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom:12.0pt;&#10;margin-left:.5in;text-indent:0in;line-height:normal">[R]evised Step 2A specifically excludes consideration of whether the additional elements represent well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Instead, analysis of well-understood, routine, conventional activity is done in Step 2B. Accordingly, in revised Step 2A <b><i>examiners should ensure that they give weight to all additional elements, whether or not they are conventional, when evaluating whether a judicial exception has been integrated into a practical application</i></b>.</div> <div style="line-height:normal">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; The 2019 Guidance provides a non-exclusive list of examples of additional elements that may have integrated the exception into a practical application.&nbsp;The 2019 Guidance emphasizes that &ldquo;examiners consider the claim as a whole when evaluating whether the judicial exception is meaningfully limited by integration into a practical application of the exception.&rdquo;<br />&nbsp;<br />&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; The 2019 Guidance then reiterates that examiners must consider the additional elements of the claim again in <i>Alice </i>step two to see whether an additional element or combination of elements &ldquo;[a]dds a specific limitation or combination of limitations that are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field&rdquo; such that the claim includes an inventive concept sufficient for patent-eligibility.<br />&nbsp;</div> <div style="line-height:normal">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; This 2019 Guidance, which applies the Federal Circuit&rsquo;s most recent decisions (<i>Finjan</i>, <i>Core Wireless</i>, <i>Data Engine</i>, and <i>Ancora</i>) focusing on how patent-eligibility can be found at <i>Alice </i>step one, provides further support that specific methods directed to making technical improvements to solve technical problems are patent-eligible under &sect; 101.<br />&nbsp;</div> <div><div>The authors may be reached at cmacedo@arelaw.com, shudak@arelaw.com. and mjones@arelaw.com.</div> <hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" /> <div id="ftn1"><div style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: x-small;">[1] Despite these changes that supersede the USPTO&rsquo;s prior guidance, the 2019 Guidance makes clear that &ldquo;any claim considered patent eligible under prior guidance should be considered patent eligible under this guidance.&rdquo;</span></div></div></div> Fri, 08 Feb 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert02082019/ ARE Patent Law Alert:<br>SUPREME COURT HOLDS CONFIDENTIAL SALES ARE PRIOR ART UNDER THE AIA<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert01222019/ On January 22, 2018, in a unanimous opinion penned by Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit&rsquo;s decision holding that a commercial sale to a third party who is required to keep the invention confidential may place the invention &ldquo;on sale&rdquo; under 35 USC &sect;102(a) and that the meaning of the phrase &ldquo;on sale&rdquo; did not change with the implementation of the America Invents Act (&ldquo;AIA&rdquo;). Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc., 586 U.S. ____ (2019)<br /><div><i>&nbsp;</i></div> <div><em>Background</em></div> <div><i>&nbsp;</i></div> <div style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">Helsinn Healthcare S.A. (&ldquo;Helsinn&rdquo;) had entered into two agreements with another company granting that company rights to sell a 0.25 mg dose of the chemical palonosetron. The agreement required that the company keep any proprietary information received from Helsinn confidential. Almost two years later, Helsinn filed a provisional patent application directed a 0.25 mg dose of palonosetron. A series of patent applications were filed off of this provisional patent application, including a fourth patent application, filed in 2013 (and thus post-AIA), that issued as U.S. Patent No. 8,598,219 (&ldquo;the &lsquo;219 Patent&rdquo;). The &lsquo;219 Patent claims a dose of 0.25 mg of palonosetron in a 5 ml solution. <br /><br />Helsinn sued Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd., and Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. (collectively &ldquo;Teva&rdquo;) for infringing its patents, including the &lsquo;219 Patent. Teva argued that the &lsquo;219 Patent was invalid under 35 USC &sect;102(a), precluding a person from obtaining a patent on an invention that was &ldquo;in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention&rdquo;. Teva prevailed at the District Court level, with the Court holding that the AIA&rsquo;s &ldquo;on sale&rdquo; provision did not apply because the public disclosure of the agreements did not disclose the 0.25 mg dose. <br /><br /><em>The Federal Circuit Decision</em><br /><br />In reversing the District Court&rsquo;s decision, the Federal Circuit held that the on-sale bar can be triggered even when the buyer is required to keep the invention confidential. Specifically, the court held, &ldquo;after the AIA, if the existence of the sale is public, the details of the invention need not be publicly disclosed in terms of sale&rdquo; for the sale to be invalidating. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2017).<br /><br /><em>The Supreme Court Decision</em><br /><br />In an unanimous decision (authored by Justice Thomas), the Court concluded that the pre-AIA precedent on the meaning of &ldquo;on sale&rdquo; applied equally to the post-AIA law. Noting that the language in USC &sect;102(a) was kept the same, with the exception of the phrase &ldquo;otherwise available to the public&rdquo;, the Court reasoned that the intention of Congress was to keep the settled meaning of the term &ldquo;on sale&rdquo;. The Court declined to read in any additional meaning to &ldquo;on sale&rdquo; from the new phrase, concluding that it was meant only as a catchall and not as modifier to the language (including the term &ldquo;on sale&rdquo;) prior to it.<br /><br />For more information please contact one of our attorneys.<br />&nbsp;</div> <div style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">&nbsp;</div> * <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/cmacedo/" target="_blank">Charles R. Macedo</a> is a Partner and <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/mhausig/" target="_blank">Matthieu Hausig</a> is a Senior Counsel at Amster, Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP. Their practice focuses on all areas of intellectual property law, including patent, trademark and copyright. They may be contacted at cmacedo@arelaw.com and mhausig@arelaw.com.<br /> Tue, 22 Jan 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert01222019/ Practical Law<br>IP Rights Clauses in Robotic Process Automation (RPA) Agreements<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/practicallaw011719/ <a href="/images/file/IP%20Rights%20Clauses%20in%20Robotic%20Process%20Automation%20(RPA)%20Agreements%20(1_17_19).pdf" target="_blank">IP Rights Clauses in Robotic Process Automation (RPA) Agreements</a> Thu, 17 Jan 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/practicallaw011719/ Time For High Court To Clarify Standing For IPR Appeals http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/011619article/ In JTEKT Corp. v. GKN Automotive Ltd.,[1] the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit added to a series of decisions, where the Federal Circuit engrafted a patent-inflicted-injury-in-fact requirement for a dissatisfied petitioner in an inter partes review proceeding to appeal an adverse final written decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. JTEKT has filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking to have the U.S. Supreme<br />Court review the Federal Circuit&rsquo;s standing jurisprudence. In RPX Corp. v. ChanBond LLC,[2] the Supreme Court invited the solicitor general to provide its views on this very important issue. This article explains why the Supreme Court should confirm a &ldquo;dissatisfied&rdquo; petitioner&rsquo;s right to challenge on appeal an adverse final written decision of the PTAB in an IPR proceeding, as set forth by Congress in 35 U.S.C. &sect; 319.<br /><br /><strong>The Federal Circuit Applies Too Narrow an Injury-in-Fact Test </strong><br /><br />JTEKT is the latest in &ldquo;a series of decisions, [where the Federal Circuit] ha[s] held the statue [35 U.S.C. &sect;141(c)] cannot be read to dispense with the Article III injury-in-fact requirement for appeal to [that] court.&rdquo;[3] <br /><br />As examples of these decisions, JTEKT cited Phigenix Inc. v. Immunogen Inc.,[4] and Consumer Watchdog v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation.[5] Phigenix required the petitioner/appellant to be &ldquo;at risk &lsquo;of infringing the [patent at issue] ... or [other] action that would implicate the patent.&rdquo;[6] Consumer Watchdog involved an inter partes re-examination by a nonprofit organization which did not conduct research and was not a competitor of the patent owner.[7] <br /><br /><a href="https://www.law360.com/articles/1118999/time-for-high-court-to-clarify-standing-for-ipr-appeals" target="_blank">Full article available here</a>. (subscription required)<br type="_moz"><br /><br /><br type="_moz" /></br> Wed, 16 Jan 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/011619article/ IPWatchdog<br>In Support of the Right of Dissatisfied Parties to Appeal Adverse IPR Decisions<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/01152019article/ On January 11th, Askeladden LLC (Askeladden) <a href="http://www.patentqualityinitiative.com/-/media/pqi/files/amicus-briefs/jtekt-v-gkn--askeladden-amicus-brief-supreme-court.pdf?la=en" target="_blank">filed an amicus brief</a> in support of the Supreme Court accepting certiorari from JTEKT Corp. v. GKN Automotive Ltd., No. 2017-1828 (Fed. Cir. 2018). This case raises the important question of whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit can refuse to hear an appeal by a non-defendant petitioner from an adverse final written decision in an inter partes review (IPR) proceeding on the basis of a lack of a patent-inflicted injury-in-fact, even though Congress has statutorily created the right for &ldquo;dissatisfied&rdquo; parties to appeal to the Federal Circuit. 35 U.S.C. &sect; 319.<br /><br />In the proceedings below, JTEKT filed a petition requesting IPR pursuant to the relevant statutory scheme devised by Congress in the America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. &sect;&sect; 311-319. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) later issued a final written decision holding the challenged claims of the patent not unpatentable.<br /><br />JTEKT then filed to appeal the PTAB&rsquo;s decision to the Federal Circuit, to which GKN Ltd. (GKN) moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of Article III standing. JTEKT had the burden to demonstrate some injury resulting from the PTAB&rsquo;s decision. JTEKT submitted two declarations in support of its standing. Although JTEKT couldn&rsquo;t definitively say whether it would infringe the patent, JTEKT argued that the general features were similar and the &ldquo;patent posed a risk to future development.&rdquo; JTEKT Corp. v. GKN Auto. Ltd., 898 F.3d 1217, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2018).<br /><br /><a href="https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/01/15/right-dissatisfied-parties-appeal-adverse-ipr-decisions/id=105140/" target="_blank">Full Article</a> Tue, 15 Jan 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/01152019article/ AMICUS BRIEF OF ASKELADDEN L.L.C. AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/amicus01112019/ Click to dowload PDF:&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="/images/AMICUS_BRIEF_OF_ASKELADDEN_L_L_C_ AS_AMICUS_CURIAE_IN_SUPPORT_OF_PETITIONER.pdf">AMICUS BRIEF OF ASKELADDEN LLC AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER</a> Fri, 11 Jan 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/amicus01112019/ In The Press:<br>Askeladden Continues to Advocate for the Ability of Non-Defendant IPR Petitioners to Appeal Adverse PTAB Decisions<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/01112019inthepress/ <div>New York, NY &mdash; Askeladden filed an amicus brief today with the United States Supreme Court in JTEKT Corp. v. GKN Automotive Ltd. advocating for the Court to review and correct the Federal Circuit&rsquo;s standing jurisprudence with respect to the ability of non-defendant inter partes review (IPR) petitioners to appeal adverse decisions of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB).&nbsp; &nbsp;</div><div>&nbsp;</div><div>In its brief, Askeladden argues that the Federal Circuit&rsquo;s decisions conflict with Supreme Court jurisprudence:</div><div>&nbsp;</div><div>&ldquo;The Federal Circuit failed to consider the Congressionally defined injury-in-fact in 35 U.S.C. &sect;319, namely, a party being &lsquo;dissatisfied&rsquo; with the PTAB&rsquo;s final written decision.&nbsp; The Federal Circuit also failed to address whether this definition promulgated by Congress exceeds the constitutional limits of Article III standing. . . .These omissions are significant.&nbsp; Spokeo explains that Congress can define an intangible injury that is sufficient to give Article III standing to a party in a proceeding to participate in a challenge to an adverse decision, even where standing would not exist but for Congress&rsquo; definition.&rdquo;</div><div>&nbsp;</div><div>In September, Askeladden submitted an amicus brief in support of JTEKT&rsquo;s petition for en banc review at the Federal Circuit.&nbsp; In July, Askeladden submitted an amicus brief in support of RPX Corporation&rsquo;s petition for certiorari in RPX Corp. v. ChanBond LLC, in which the standing of non-defendant IPR petitioners to appeal adverse PTAB decisions is at issue.</div><div>&nbsp;</div><div>Askeladden filed the briefs as part of its Patent Quality Initiative, which seeks to improve patent quality and promote innovation by challenging poor quality patents, addressing questionable patent practices, and regularly filing amicus briefs in cases concerning important issues of patent law.</div><div>&nbsp;</div><div>Askeladden is represented by Amster Rothstein and Ebenstein LLP.</div><div>&nbsp;</div><a href="http://www.patentqualityinitiative.com/news/press-releases/news-items/jtekt-amicus-brief---supreme-court" target="_blank">Article Available Here</a>. Fri, 11 Jan 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/01112019inthepress/ Is the Government a ‘Person’? NYIPLA tells SCOTUS it depends http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/inthepress12202018/ By <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/cmacedo/" target="_blank">Charles R. Macedo</a> &amp; <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/dgoldberg/" target="_blank">David Goldberg</a>&nbsp;&amp; <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/jhahm/" target="_blank">Jung Hahm</a> &amp; Peter Thurlow &amp; Robert Isackson &amp; Robert J. Rando<br /><br />On Monday, December 17, 2018, the New York Intellectual Property Association (&ldquo;NYIPLA&rdquo;) filed an <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/images/file/17-1594 ac NY Intellectual Property Law Association.pdf" target="_blank">amicus brief</a> in support of neither party in Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, No. 17-1594 (U.S.).<br /><br />In the proceedings below, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (&ldquo;PTAB&rdquo;) issued a final written decision in a Covered Business Method patent review (&ldquo;CBM&rdquo;) proceeding instituted based on a petition by the U.S. Postal Service (&ldquo;USPS&rdquo;), invalidating certain claims of a patent owned (and asserted in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims) by Return Mail, Inc. USPS is a &ldquo;government entity&rdquo; as recognized in United States Postal Serv. v. Flamingo Indus. (USA) Ltd., 540 U.S. 736, 748 (2004). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (&ldquo;Federal Circuit&rdquo;) affirmed the PTAB&rsquo;s holding that USPS has standing to file a petition to institute a CBM proceeding.<br /><br />The U.S. Supreme Court granted Return Mail&rsquo;s petition for a writ of certiorari on the question of whether the government is a &ldquo;person&rdquo; who may petition to institute review proceedings under the AIA.<br />While the NYIPLA took no position as to the ultimate merits of Petitioner Return Mail&rsquo;s underlying position, i.e., whether the government is a &ldquo;person&rdquo; who may petition to institute a CBM proceeding under AIA &sect; 18(a)(1)(B), the NYIPLA argued that it strongly believes that the Court should carefully consider the potential implications of interpreting &ldquo;person&rdquo; in Title 35 of the U.S. Code (&ldquo;Patent Act&rdquo;) and the AIA as including or excluding the government generally, and then issue only a narrow holding on the scope of &ldquo;person&rdquo; under AIA &sect; 18(a)(1)(B) and, if at all, under 35 U.S.C. &sect;&sect; 311(a) and 321(a).<br /><br />Full article available at:&nbsp;<br /><br /><a href="http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/12/20/government-person-nyipla-scotus-depends/id=104408/" target="_blank">www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/12/20/government-person-nyipla-scotus-depends/id=104408/</a><br type="_moz" /> Thu, 20 Dec 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/inthepress12202018/ LAW360 REPORTS ON AMICUS BRIEF FILED IN RETURN MAIL V. US POSTAL SERVICE WITH U.S. SUPREME COURT http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/inthepress12182018/ IP Groups, Think Tank Tell Justics Gov't Isn't A 'Person'<br />Law360 (December 18, 2018)<br /><br />By Matthew Bultman<br /><br /><a href="https://www.law360.com/articles/1112608/ip-groups-think-tank-tell-justices-gov-t-isn-t-a-person" target="_blank">https://www.law360.com/articles/1112608/ip-groups-think-tank-tell-justices-gov-t-isn-t-a-person</a><br />(available by subscription only)<br /><br />Law 360 report:<br /><br />The New York Intellectual Property Law Association has a somewhat different view.<br /><br />While the NYIPLA said it might be that the government cannot petition for CBM review, the group said the government may still be a &ldquo;person&rdquo; able to file IPRs and PGRs. It said the AIA&rsquo;s provision dealing with CBMs was &ldquo;more limiting.&rdquo;<br /><br />&ldquo;The NYIPLA respectfully urges that, despite the broad wording of the question presented, the holding in this case be expressly limited to CBMs (leaving the question for IPRs and PGRs open for decision on another day in a factually more appropriate vehicle),&rdquo; the group wrote.<br /><br />***<br /><br />The NYIPLA is represented by <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/cmacedo/" target="_blank">Charles R. Macedo</a>, <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/dgoldberg/" target="_blank">David P. Goldberg</a> and <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/jhahm/" target="_blank">Jung S. Hahm</a> of <a href="https://www.law360.com/firms/amster-rothstein" target="_blank">Amster Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP</a>, Peter Thurlow of <a href="https://www.law360.com/firms/polsinelli" target="_blank">Polsinelli PC</a>, Robert M. Isackson of <a href="https://www.law360.com/firms/leason-ellis" target="_blank">Leason Ellis LLP</a>, and Robert J. Rando of The Rando Law Firm PC.<br /><br />A copy of NYIPLA's Amicus Brief is available <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/images/file/17-1594%20ac%20NY%20Intellectual%20Property%20Law%20Association.pdf" target="_blank">here</a>. Tue, 18 Dec 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/inthepress12182018/ Amicus Brief of New York Intellectual Property Law Association in Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, et al. http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/amicus12172018/ <em><b>Click to download PDF:&nbsp;&nbsp;</b></em><a href="/images/file/17-1594%20ac%20NY%20Intellectual%20Property%20Law%20Association.pdf" target="_blank">Amicus Brief of New York Intellectual Property Law Association in Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, et al.</a> Mon, 17 Dec 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/amicus12172018/ The NYIPLA Report:<br>Recent Developments in Patent Law at the U.S. Supreme Court: OIL STATES, SAS INSTITUTE, and WESTERNGECO http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/article11292018/ <div style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">On April 24, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court (&ldquo;Supreme Court&rdquo;) issued its much-anticipated decisions in <i>Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene&rsquo;s Energy Group, LLC</i> and </span><i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu</span></i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">. The first decision reaffirms the constitutionality of <i>inter partes</i> review proceedings and the second rejects current PTAB practice to grant the partial institution of <i>inter partes</i> reviews as ultra vires.&nbsp; Accordingly, these two decisions mean that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office&rsquo;s <i>inter partes</i> review proceedings for the reconsideration of a prior grant of a patent will continue to be available, but only with appropriate procedural adjustments.</span></span></div><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Further, on June 22, 2018, the Supreme Court in <i>WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp.</i> held that the damages provision of 35 U.S.C. &sect; 284 permits recovery of foreign lost profits when infringement is found under 35 U.S.C. &sect; 271(f)(2), expanding the scope of damages under the Patent Act.</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Together, this past term at the Supreme Court brought additional insight into the role of Patent Law within our administrative state, and revitalized some theories related to damages law.</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: small;"><b><i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">I. Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene&rsquo;s Energy Group, LLC</span></i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"> </span></b></span><b><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; text-align: justify;">In </span><i style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; text-align: justify;">Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene&rsquo;s Energy Group, LLC</i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; text-align: justify;">, the Supreme Court</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; text-align: justify;"> affirmed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit&rsquo;s (&ldquo;Federal Circuit&rdquo;) </span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; text-align: justify;">judgment that </span><i style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; text-align: justify;">inter partes</i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; text-align: justify;"> review does not violate Article III or the Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 138 S. Ct. 1365 (U.S. 2018). </span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; text-align: justify;">The decision centered on the debate over whether issued patents are a &ldquo;public right&rdquo; or a &ldquo;private right.&rdquo; The Court had previously recognized that &ldquo;the decision to grant a patent is a matter involving public rights&mdash;specifically, the grant of a public franchise&shy;.&rdquo; </span><i style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; text-align: justify;">Id</i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; text-align: justify;">. at 1373. Therefore, the Court held, because &ldquo;</span><i style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; text-align: justify;">inter partes</i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; text-align: justify;"> review is simply a reconsideration of that grant, and Congress has permissibly reserved the PTO&rsquo;s authority to conduct that reconsideration,&rdquo; that the PTO can reevaluate the patentability of claims without violating Article III. </span><i style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; text-align: justify;">Id</i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; text-align: justify;">. </span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; text-align: justify;">The 7-2 majority opinion of the Court was written by Justice Thomas and joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor and Kagan.</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; text-align: justify;">&nbsp; </span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; text-align: justify;">Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts joined.</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">A. Question Presented</span></b></span><b><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></b><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The Supreme Court accepted certiorari on the question of &ldquo;whether <i>inter partes </i>review&mdash;an adversarial process used by the Patent and Trademark Office . . . to analyze the validity of existing patents</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><a name="OLE_LINK2"></a><a name="OLE_LINK1"><span style="font-size: small;">&mdash;</span></a></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">violates the Constitution by extinguishing private property rights through a non-Article III forum without a jury.&rdquo; <i>See</i> </span><i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene&rsquo;s Energy Group, LLC</span></i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">, 137 S. Ct. 2239 (U.S. 2018). </span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">B. Background </span></b></span><b><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></b><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2012 (&ldquo;AIA&rdquo;) established a process called <i>inter partes</i> review (&ldquo;IPR&rdquo;) by which the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (&ldquo;PTO&rdquo;) may reconsider and cancel wrongly issued patent claims. The procedure may only be commenced by a third-party petitioner and not by the owner of the patent at issue. 35 U.S.C. &sect; 311(a). The petitioner may file a petition with the PTO seeking cancellation of claims as obvious or anticipated. 35 U.S.C. &sect; 311(b). If there is a &ldquo;reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged,&rdquo; and review is granted, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (&ldquo;PTAB&rdquo;) will examine the patent&rsquo;s validity. 35 U.S.C. &sect;&sect; 314, 316. Unless the proceeding is settled or dismissed, the PTAB must issue a final written decision, confirming or canceling patent claims. 35 U.S.C. &sect; 318. The decision is subject to judicial review by the Federal Circuit. 35 U.S.C. &sect; 319.</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">In the IPR proceeding below, the PTAB issued a final written decision holding the challenged claims of the patent owned by Oil States Energy Services, LLC (&ldquo;Oil States&rdquo;) to be unpatentable. 138 S. Ct. at 1372. In appealing from the PTAB&rsquo;s decision, Oil States challenged the constitutionality of IPR, arguing that &ldquo;actions to revoke a patent must be tried in an Article III court before a jury.&rdquo; <i>Id</i>.&nbsp; The Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB&rsquo;s decision because it had already rejected such constitutional arguments in <i>MCM Portfolio LLC v Hewlett-Packard Co.</i> 812 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2015).&nbsp; The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether IPR violates Article III or the Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and concluded that it violates neither. 138 S. Ct. at<i> </i>1379<i>.</i>&nbsp; </span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">C. Analysis</span></b></span><b><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></b><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">In reaching its decision, the Court focused on whether issued patents are a &ldquo;public right&rdquo; or a &ldquo;private right.&rdquo; The Court&rsquo;s &ldquo;precedents have distinguished between &lsquo;public rights&rsquo; and &lsquo;private rights&rsquo;&rdquo; when determining whether a proceeding should involve an &ldquo;exercise of Article III judicial power.&rdquo; <i>Id</i>. at 1373. These precedents have given Congress the power &ldquo;to assign adjudication of public rights,&rdquo; as opposed to private rights, to decision-making entities other than Article III federal courts. <i>Id</i>. </span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Since the grant of a patent has been recognized as a &ldquo;matter involving public rights,&rdquo; &nbsp;and because &ldquo;inter partes review involves the same basic matter as the grant of a patent,&rdquo; the Supreme Court determined that &ldquo;[i]nter partes review falls squarely within the public rights doctrine.&rdquo;&nbsp; <i>Id</i>. at 1373-74. Specifically, the Court explained that:</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:1.0in;margin-bottom:6.0pt;margin-left:&#10;1.0in;text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">This Court has recognized, and the parties do not dispute, that the decision to <i>grant</i> a patent is a matter involving public rights&mdash;specifically, the grant of a public franchise.&nbsp; Inter partes review is simply a reconsideration of that grant, and Congress has permissibly reserved the PTO&rsquo;s authority to conduct that reconsideration. Thus, the PTO can do so without violating Article III.</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Id</span></i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">. at 1373. </span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Citing <i>Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee</i>, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (U.S. 2016), the Court reaffirmed that IPRs are merely a &ldquo;second look at an earlier administrative grant of a patent,&rdquo; because &ldquo;[t]he Board considers the same statutory requirements that the PTO considered when granting the patent.&rdquo; <i>Id</i>. at 1374. Considering these same statutory requirements prevents the &ldquo;issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from public domain.&rdquo; <i>Id</i>. Similar to the initial review of a patent application:</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:1.0in;margin-bottom:0in;margin-left:1.0in;&#10;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">[T]he Board&rsquo;s inter partes review protects &ldquo;the public&rsquo;s paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies are kept within their legitimate scope,&rdquo; <i>Cuozzo</i>. Thus, inter partes review involves the same interests as the determination to grant a patent in the first instance.&nbsp;</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></p><span style="font-size: small;"><p style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:1.0in;margin-bottom:0in;margin-left:1.0in;&#10;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify"><i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></i></p> </span><p style="margin-right:1.0in;text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Id</span></i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">. (citations omitted).</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">It &ldquo;does not make a difference&rdquo; that IPR occurs after the issue of a patent. <i>Id</i>. In fact, the grant of a patent claim is subject to the qualification that the PTO has the authority to reexamine, and potentially cancel, the patent claim in IPR. <i>Id</i>. Thus, patents remain subject to the PTAB&rsquo;s authority even after the issue of the patent. <i>Id</i>. </span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Next, the Court determined that the prior decisions cited by Oil States that recognize patent rights as the &ldquo;private property of the patentee&rdquo; do not contradict the conclusion that IPR does not violate Article III. <i>Id</i>. at 1375. The Court noted that those precedents were decided under the Patent Act of 1870, which did not provide for any post-issuance administrative review, and held that &ldquo;[t]hose precedents . . . are best read as a description of the statutory scheme that existed at that time.&rdquo;&nbsp; <i>Id</i>. at 1376.</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;&nbsp;</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The Court also held that, contrary to the contention by Oil States and the dissent, &ldquo;history does not establish that patent validity is a matter that, &lsquo;from its nature,&rsquo; must be decided by a court.&rdquo;&nbsp; <i>Id</i>. (citation omitted). The Court explained: </span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:1.0in;margin-bottom:6.0pt;margin-left:&#10;1.0in;text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Historical practice is not decisive here because matters governed by the public rights doctrine &ldquo;from their nature&rdquo; can be resolved in multiple ways: Congress can &ldquo;reserve to itself the power to decide,&rdquo; &ldquo;delegate that power to executive officers,&rdquo; or &ldquo;commit it to judicial tribunals.&rdquo;&nbsp; That Congress chose the courts in the past does not foreclose its choice of the PTO today.</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Id</span></i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">. at 1378 (citation omitted). </span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">In addition, the Court rejected Oil States&rsquo;s argument that IPR violates Article III based on the similarities between the various procedures used in IPR and typical court procedures, noting that:&nbsp; </span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:1.0in;margin-bottom:6.0pt;margin-left:&#10;1.0in;text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">[T]his Court has never adopted a &ldquo;looks like&rdquo; test to determine if an adjudication has improperly occurred outside of an Article III court.&nbsp; The fact that an agency uses court-like procedures does not necessarily mean it is exercising the judicial power.</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Id</span></i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">. (citation omitted).&nbsp; </span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Finally, the Court determined that IPR does not violate the Seventh Amendment, because &ldquo;when Congress properly assigns a matter to adjudication in a non-Article III tribunal, the Seventh Amendment poses no independent bar to the adjudication of that action by a nonjury factfinder.&rdquo;&nbsp; <i>Id</i>. at 1379 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).&nbsp; </span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Emphasizing the narrowness of its holding, the Court noted that its decision only addresses the constitutionality of IPR and that it does not consider &ldquo;whether inter partes review would be constitutional without any sort of intervention by a court at any stage of the proceedings.&rdquo;&nbsp; <i>Id</i>. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).&nbsp; The Court also explained that &ldquo;Oil States does not challenge the retroactive application of inter partes review, even though that procedure was not in place when its patent issued.&rdquo;&nbsp; <i>Id</i>. Finally, the Court cautioned against misconstruing its decision &ldquo;as suggesting that patents are not property for purposes of the Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause.&rdquo;&nbsp; <i>Id</i>. (citations omitted).</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">D. Concurrence</span></b></span><b><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p><span style="font-size: small;"><p style="text-align:justify"><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></b></p> </span><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsberg and Sotomayor, concurred, emphasizing that the Court&rsquo;s conclusion does not necessarily bar private rights from being adjudicated in anything other than by Article III courts. &nbsp;<i>Id</i>. (Breyer, J., concurring).</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><i><o:p></o:p></i></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">E. Dissent </span></b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;&nbsp;</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Justice Gorsuch&rsquo;s dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, analogized a patent to a &ldquo;personal right-no less than a home or a farm,&rdquo; and argued that patent rights should be adjudicated by Article III courts. <i>Id</i>. at 1380 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, patentees can only be divested of patent rights by Article III judges. <i>Id</i>. Disputing the Court&rsquo;s equation of grant and revocation, the dissent argued that just because one gives a gift, such as a patent, does not mean that one can forever enjoy the right to reclaim it. <i>Id.</i> at 1385. Such a stance, they viewed, is &ldquo;a retreat from Article III&rsquo;s guarantees.&rdquo; <i>Id. </i>at 1386.</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><b><i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">II. SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu</span></i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"> </span></b></span><b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&#10;"><o:p></o:p></span></b><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">On the same day that the <i>Oil States </i>decision was issued, the Supreme Court also issued a 5-4 opinion in <i>SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu</i> that reversed the decision of the Federal Circuit and held that &ldquo;the petitioner in an <i>inter partes </i>review is entitled to a decision on all the claims it has challenged.&rdquo; 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358 (U.S. 2018).</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;&#10;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The majority opinion, written by Justice Gorsuch and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas and Alito, concluded that 35 U.S.C. &sect; 318(a) provides a &ldquo;clear&rdquo; answer, because &ldquo;any&rdquo; in this statutory provision means &ldquo;every.&rdquo; <i>Id</i>. at 1353. The decision focuses heavily on the plain language of the statute and determined that &ldquo;everything in the statute before [the Court] confirms that [petitioner] is entitled to a final written decision addressing<b><i> </i></b><i>all of the claims it has challenged</i> and nothing suggests [that the Court] lack[s] the power to say so[.]&rdquo; <i>Id</i>. at 1360. </span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;&#10;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">A. Question Presented</span></b></span><b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p><span style="font-size: small;"><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></b></p> </span><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question: &ldquo;Does 35 U.S.C. &sect; 318(a), which provides that the Patent Trial and Appeal Board in an inter partes review &lsquo;shall issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner,&rsquo; require that Board to issue a final written decision as to every claim challenged by the petitioner, or does it allow that Board to issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of only some of the patent claims challenged by the petitioner, as the Federal Circuit held?&rdquo; <i>SAS Institute Inc. v. Lee</i>, 137 S. Ct. 2160 (U.S. 2017).</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;&#10;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">B. Background</span></b></span><b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></b><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">By way of background, this case began when SAS Institute Inc. (&ldquo;SAS&rdquo;) petitioned for IPR of ComplementSoft, LLC&rsquo;s (&ldquo;ComplementSoft&rdquo;) software patent. <i>Id</i>. at 1353.&nbsp; In its petition, SAS alleged that all 16 of the patent&rsquo;s claims were unpatentable.<i>&nbsp; </i>The PTAB concluded that SAS likely would succeed with respect to at least one of the claims and that an IPR was warranted.&nbsp; However, the PTAB did not institute review on all of the challenged claims in the petition, and instead, only instituted review on some of the claims while denying review on the rest.&nbsp; The final written decision ultimately issued by the PTAB did not address those claims on which the PTAB refused to institute review. <i>SAS</i>, 138 S. Ct. at 1354. </span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;&#10;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">SAS appealed to the Federal Circuit, arguing that 35 U.S.C. &sect; 318(a) required the PTAB to decide the patentability of <i>every</i> claim a petitioner challenges in its petition, not just some. <i>Id</i>. </span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;&#10;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The relevant statute addressed by the <i>SAS </i>Court, as applied to IPRs, provides:</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;&#10;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.6in;margin-bottom:0in;&#10;margin-left:.6in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">(a) Final Written Decision&mdash;</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.6in;margin-bottom:0in;&#10;margin-left:.6in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">If an <i>inter partes</i> review is instituted and not dismissed under this chapter, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board <b><i>shall</i></b> issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of <b><i>any</i></b> patent claim challenged by the petitioner and <b><i>any</i></b> new claim added under section 316(d).</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">35 U.S.C. &sect; 318(a) (emphasis added). </span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;&#10;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The Federal Circuit rejected SAS&rsquo;s argument<i> </i>and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the question for itself. <i>SAS</i>, 137 S. Ct. at 2160.</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;&#10;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">C. Analysis</span></b></span><b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></b><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The majority of the Court found that the plain language of the text of 35 U.S.C. &sect; 318(a) &ldquo;supplies a ready answer.&rdquo;<i> SAS</i>, 138 S. Ct. at 1354. <i>&nbsp;</i>In particular, the Court focused on interpretation of the terms &ldquo;shall&rdquo; and &ldquo;any&rdquo; in the statute. While &ldquo;shall&rdquo; tends to &ldquo;impose[] a nondiscretionary duty,&rdquo; the &ldquo;any&rdquo; carries a more &ldquo;expansive meaning.&rdquo; <i>Id.</i>&nbsp; Therefore, the Court determined that the statute requires that &ldquo;the Board <i>must</i> address <i>every</i> claim the petitioner has challenged.&rdquo; <i>Id. </i>(emphasis added).</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;&#10;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">In reaching the decision, the Court rejected the notion that the Director of the Patent Office (&ldquo;Director&rdquo;) retains a discretionary &ldquo;partial institution&rdquo; power since such power does not appear anywhere in the statute. Instead, the Court explained:</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;&#10;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:1.0in;margin-bottom:0in;&#10;margin-left:1.0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Much as in the civil litigation system it mimics, in an inter partes review the petitioner is master of its complaint and normally entitled to judgment on all of the claims it raises, not just those the decisionmaker might wish to address. </span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right:1.0in;text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Id</span></i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">. at 1355.</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&#10;"><b><o:p></o:p></b></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">In this connection, the Court observed that &ldquo;[f]rom the outset, we see that Congress chose to structure a process in which it&rsquo;s the petitioner, not the Director, who gets to define the contours of the proceeding.&rdquo; <i>Id</i>.</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;&#10;font-family:"><b><o:p></o:p></b></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">35 U.S.C. &sect; 314(a) provides that the Director may not institute an IPR unless &ldquo;there is a reasonable likelihood&rdquo; that the petitioner will prevail on at least one of the challenged claims. <i>Id</i>. at 1356. However, the Court rejected the Director&rsquo;s argument that the this statutory provision on institution of <i>inter partes</i> review supports the Director&rsquo;s &ldquo;partial institution&rdquo; power because, &ldquo;while &sect; 314(a) invests the Director with discretion on the question <i>whether</i> to institute review, it doesn&rsquo;t follow that the statute affords him discretion regarding <i>what</i> claims that review will encompass.&rdquo; <i>Id</i>. &nbsp;</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;&#10;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The Director also argued that because language of the statute requires him to &ldquo;evaluate claims individually,&rdquo; it, therefore, allows him to institute review on a claim-by-claim basis. However, the Court reasoned: </span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;&#10;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:1.0in;margin-bottom:0in;&#10;margin-left:1.0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Section 314(a) . . . simply requires [the Director] to decide whether the petitioner is likely to succeed on &ldquo;at least 1&rdquo; claim.&nbsp; Once that single claim threshold is satisfied, it doesn&rsquo;t matter whether the petitioner is likely to prevail on any additional claims; the Director need not even consider any other claim before instituting review. Rather than contemplate claim-by-claim institution, then, the language anticipates a regime where a reasonable prospect of success on a single claim justifies review of all. </span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right:1.0in;text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Id</span></i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">. at 1356. </span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&#10;"><b><o:p></o:p></b></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The Director&rsquo;s argument that the statute is ambiguous on the propriety of the partial institution practice was flatly denied.&nbsp; &ldquo;[A]fter applying traditional tools of interpretation here, we are left with no uncertainty that could warrant deference&rdquo; to the Director&rsquo;s interpretation under <i>Chevron USA Inc. v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc</i>., 467 US 837 (1984). <i>Id</i>. at 1538. &ldquo;There is no room in this [statutory] scheme for a wholly unmentioned &lsquo;partial institution&rsquo; power that lets the Director select only some challenged claims for decision.&rdquo;&nbsp; <i>Id</i>.</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;&#10;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The Court also rejected the Director&rsquo;s argument that judicial review of the question of whether the partial institution practice is permitted under the statute is itself foreclosed by 35 U.S.C. &sect; 314(d) and previous Supreme Court precedent in <i>Cuozzo</i>.&nbsp; The Court determined that the Director &ldquo;overread[] both the statute and [the Court&rsquo;s] precedent,&rdquo; and held that judicial review remains available to determine whether the Director exceeded his statutory authority by limiting IPR to fewer than all of the claims the petitioner challenged. <i>Id</i>. at 1360.</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Finally, the Court rejected the Director&rsquo;s policy argument on the efficiency of partial institution, noting that &ldquo;[p]olicy arguments are properly addressed to Congress, not this Court.&rdquo; <i>Id</i>. at 1358. </span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Ultimately, the Court decided that &ldquo;everything in the statute before [the Court] confirms that [petitioner] is entitled to a final written decision addressing all of the claims it has challenged and nothing suggests [that the Court] lack[s] the power to say so[.]&rdquo; <i>Id</i>. at 1360.</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; line-height: 15pt; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">D. Dissenting Opinions</span></b></span><b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;&#10;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">In a dissent, Justice Ginsburg described the majority&rsquo;s reading of the statute as &ldquo;wooden&rdquo; and lacking of any true understanding of congressional intent. <i>Id</i>. at 1360 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).&nbsp; Justice Ginsburg also fully supported Justice Breyer&rsquo;s dissenting opinion. </span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">In his separate dissent, Justice Breyer argued that the statute is ambiguous and that the PTO&rsquo;s interpretation is reasonable. His dissent observes that, under <i>Chevron</i>, an agency is granted leeway to enact rules that are reasonable in light of the text, nature, and purpose of an ambiguous statute. <i>Id</i>. at 1364 (Breyer, J., dissenting). He explained that, &ldquo;there is a gap, the agency possesses gap-filling authority, and it filled the gap with a regulation that . . . is a reasonable exercise of that authority.&rdquo; <i>Id</i>. at 1365. </span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; line-height: 15pt; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">E. The PTO&rsquo;s Response to the <i>SAS </i>Decision</span></b></span><b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;&#10;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">On April 26, 2018, just two days after the <i>SAS </i>decision, the PTAB issued guidance on the effects the Supreme Court&rsquo;s decision would have on the IPR process and other AIA proceedings. &nbsp;</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The PTAB&rsquo;s new guidelines clarify that from April 26 on, &ldquo;[a]s required by the decision, the PTAB will <i>institute as to all claims or none</i>,&rdquo; and if a trial is instituted, the PTAB will institute on &ldquo;all challenges raised in the petition,&rdquo; Memorandum from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board on Guidance on the Impact of <i>SAS </i>on AIA Proceedings (Apr. 26, 2018),&nbsp; </span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><a href="https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patent-trial-and-appeal-board/trials/guidance-impact-sas-aia-trial" target="_blank"><span style="font-size: small;">https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patent-trial-and-appeal-board/trials/guidance-impact-sas-aia-trial</span></a><span style="font-size: small;"> (emphasis added).&nbsp; In other words, a petition will either be granted in its entirety, or denied in its entirety. <i>Id</i>. </span><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">For cases in which the PTAB has already instituted an IPR on only some (but not all) of the challenges raised in the petition, &ldquo;the panel may issue an order supplementing the institution decision to institute on all challenges raised in the petition.&rdquo; <i>Id. </i>The PTAB panel may then take further action to manage the trial proceeding, including, for example, permitting additional time, briefing, discovery, and/or oral argument, depending on various circumstances and the stage of the proceeding. <i>Id.</i></span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Finally, the new guidelines specify that &ldquo;upon receipt of an order supplementing the institution decision, the petitioner and patent owner <i>shall meet and confer<b> </b></i>to discuss the need for additional briefing and/or any other adjustments to the schedule. While the Board may act <i>sua sponte </i>in some cases, <i>additional briefing and schedule adjustments might not be ordered if not requested by the parties</i>.&rdquo;&nbsp; <i>Id</i>. (emphasis added). The parties may agree to <i>affirmatively waive additional briefing or schedule changes,</i>&rdquo; and contact the Board to discuss any request. <i>Id.</i> (emphasis added).</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">As for the scope of the final written decision, it &ldquo;will address, to the extent claims are still pending at the time of decision, all patent claims challenged by the petitioner and all new claims added through the amendment process.&rdquo; <i>Id.</i></span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Concurrent with the issued guidance, the PTAB designated as informative its order in <i>Western Digital Corp. v. SPEX Techs., Inc.</i>, IPR2018-00082, Paper 11 (PTAB Apr. 25, 2018). In this case, IPR was instituted on all of four grounds against 11 claims presented in the petition, even though only two grounds against two claims met the reasonable likelihood threshold.</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><br /> Additionally, as a sample order supplementing an institution decision, <i>Emerson Elec. Co. v. IPCO, LLC</i>, IPR2017-00213, Paper 41 (PTAB Apr. 26, 2018), was recognized as being informative for amending the institution decision to include review of all claims and all grounds presented in the petition, and to asking whether the parties desire any changes to the schedule or additional briefing.</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Lastly, </span><i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">SK Hynix Inc. v. Netlist, Inc</span></i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">., IPR2017-00548, Paper 25 at 16 (PTAB May 3, 2018), was recognized as being a sample post-<i>SAS</i> final written decision. The final written decision addressed only the instituted grounds (two out of five grounds presented in the petition), but authorized the parties to file a rehearing request<b><i> </i></b>&ldquo;[t]o the extent either Patent Owner or Petitioner believes that the Court&rsquo;s decision in <i>SAS Institute </i>requires additional consideration in this proceeding.&rdquo; <i>Id</i>.</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&#10;"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">III. <i>WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp.</i></span></b></span><b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&#10;"><i><o:p></o:p></i></span></b></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">On June 22, 2018, the Supreme Court in <i>WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp.</i> reversed the Federal Circuit&rsquo;s decision, and held in a 7-2 decision that a patent owner can collect lost foreign profits. 138 S. Ct. 2129 (U.S. 2018).</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The majority opinion authored by Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Alito, Sotomayor and Kagan, confirmed that the presumption against extraterritoriality does not preclude patent owners from recovering lost profits that arise from infringement resulting from conduct outside of the United States. The majority opinion concentrated on &ldquo;the focus&rdquo; of the statute, and whether that &ldquo;focus&rdquo; can be said to have occurred domestically. <i>Id</i>. at 2137-38.</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="margin-left: 0.25in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -0.25in; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">A.<span style="font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-weight: normal; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal; font-family: " times="" new="">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span></span></b><!--[endif]--><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Question Presented</span></b></span><b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&#10;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">WesternGeco</span></i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"> addressed an important question regarding whether a patent owner can recover damages for a defendant&rsquo;s activities outside the United States. Specifically, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of &ldquo;whether the court of appeals erred in holding that lost profits arising from prohibited combinations occurring outside of the United States are categorically unavailable in cases where patent infringement is proven under 35 U.S.C. &sect; 271(f).&rdquo; <i>See</i> <i>WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp.</i>, 138 S. Ct. 734 (U.S. 2018).</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;&#10;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="margin-left: 0.25in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -0.25in; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">B.<span style="font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-weight: normal; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal; font-family: " times="" new="">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span></span></b><!--[endif]--><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Background</span></b></span><b><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">WesternGeco LLC (&ldquo;WesternGeco&rdquo;) owns patents for a system used to scan the ocean floor for oil and gas deposits.&nbsp; <i>WesternGeco</i>, 138 S. Ct. at 2135. ION Geophysical Corp. (&ldquo;ION&rdquo;) began selling a competing system that was built from components manufactured in the United States. <i>Id</i>. The components were shipped by ION to companies abroad, which then assembled the components to create a system that is indistinguishable from&mdash;and competes with&mdash;that of WesternGeco. <i>Id</i>.</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">WesternGeco brought suit against ION alleging patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. &sect; 271(f)(2) of the Patent Act, thereby arguing its entitlement to damages to compensate for infringement under 35 U.S.C. &sect; 284. <i>Id</i>. &nbsp;&nbsp;</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas found ION liable for infringement, and awarded WesternGeco $93.4 million in damages. <i>Id</i>.</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">ION appealed to the Federal Circuit, arguing that WesternGeco could not recover damages for lost profits because &sect; 271(f) does not apply extraterritorially. Because it had previously held that the general infringement provision, &sect; 271(a), does not allow patent owners to recover for lost foreign sales, the Federal Circuit reasoned that &sect; 271(f) should be interpreted in the same way. <i>Id</i>. Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that WesternGeco was not entitled to damages for lost foreign profits. <i>Id</i>.</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">WesternGeco petitioned for review in the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari on the question of whether the general damages provision, 35 U.S.C. &sect; 284, permits recovery of foreign lost profits for infringement under 35 U.S.C. &sect; 271(f)(2). <i>Id</i>. at 2135-36.</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="margin-left: 0.5in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -0.25in; line-height: 15pt; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">C.<span style="font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-weight: normal; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal; font-family: " times="" new="">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span></span></b><!--[endif]--><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Analysis</span></b></span><b><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Reversing the decision of the Federal Circuit below, the Supreme Court concluded that WesternGeco&rsquo;s award for lost foreign profits attributable to domestic acts of infringement under 35 USC &sect; 271(f)(2) was a permissible domestic application of &sect; 284. <i>Id</i>. at 2139. The Court determined that the &ldquo;focus&rdquo; of &sect; 284 was &ldquo;infringement,&rdquo; and that the infringement at issue &mdash;namely the supplying of components&mdash;was domestic. <i>Id</i>. at 2138. </span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Because Congress is said to generally legislate with domestic concerns in mind, and to prevent dispute between our laws and those of other nations, the presumption of the Courts is that federal statutes only &ldquo;apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.&rdquo; <i>Id</i>. at 2136. </span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The Supreme Court has established a two-step framework for determining questions of extraterritoriality. <i>Id</i>. <b><i>First</i></b>, a court asks &ldquo;whether the presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted.&rdquo; <i>Id</i>. To be considered rebutted, the text must provide a &ldquo;clear indication of an extraterritorial application.&rdquo; <i>Id. </i>If the presumption against extraterritoriality has not been rebutted, the <b><i>second</i></b> step is to ask &ldquo;whether the case involves a domestic application of the statute.&rdquo; <i>Id. </i>This determination is made by identifying the &ldquo;focus&rdquo; of the statute, and asking &ldquo;whether the conduct relevant to that focus occurred in the United States territory.&rdquo; <i>Id. </i>If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, then the case involves a permissible domestic application of the statute. <i>Id.</i></span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">While it is preferable to begin the analysis at step one, courts have discretion to begin with step two in &ldquo;appropriate cases,&rdquo; where addressing step one would require resolving &ldquo;difficult questions&rdquo; that do not change &ldquo;the outcome of the case&rdquo; but could have far-reaching effects in future cases. <i>Id. </i>In this case, the Court decided to exercise the discretion to begin with step two. <i>Id.</i> at 2136-37.</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">In determining whether the case involves domestic applications of the statutes, the second step requires consideration of the &ldquo;focus&rdquo; of the statutes. <i>Id</i>. at 1237. The Court explained, the &ldquo;&lsquo;focus&rsquo; of a statute is the &lsquo;objec[t] of [its] solicitude,&rsquo; which can include the conduct it &lsquo;seeks to regulate,&rsquo; as well as the parties and interests it &lsquo;seeks to protect[t]&rsquo; or vindicate.&rsquo;&rdquo; <i>Id. </i>The case involves permissible domestic application of the statute if the conduct relevant to the statute&rsquo;s focus occurred in the United States. However, regardless of any other conduct that occurred within the United States, if the relevant conduct occurs in another country, the extraterritorial application of the statute is impermissible. <i>Id</i>. </span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Applying the above principles to the statutes at issue in the case at hand, the Court concluded that the conduct relevant to the statutory focus in the case was domest</span></span></p> Thu, 29 Nov 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/article11292018/