Amster Rothstein & Ebenstein, LLP - Intellectual Property Law http://www.arelaw.com/ Amster, Rothstein & Ebenstein is a well-established mid-sized legal firm engaged exclusively in the practice of intellectual property law, including patents, trademarks, copyrights, unfair competition and related matters. Since our inception in 1953, we have earned an impressive record of successes for our clients, from individuals to multinational corporations, both domestic and worldwide. These successes are borne of the vigorous application of legal expertise, innovation and objective analysis. en Fri, 22 Jun 2018 22:21:27 +0000 Floodlight Design CMS IP-Watch Inside Views:<br>Rethinking Article III Standing In IPR Appeals At The Federal Circuit (US)<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/article061818/ <a href="http://www.ip-watch.org/2018/06/18/rethinking-article-iii-standing-ipr-appeals-federal-circuit-us/#_edn1" target="_blank">In January 2018, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in&nbsp;<em>RPX Corp. v. Chanbond LLC</em>&nbsp;issued a non-precedential order dismissing an appeal by RPX (as a dissatisfied petitioner) of an adverse final written decision in an&nbsp;<em>inter partes&nbsp;</em>review (&ldquo;IPR&rdquo;) proceeding initiated in response to RPX&rsquo;s petition.&nbsp;In particular, by applying is prior precedential decisions in&nbsp;<em>Consumer Watchdog v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation</em>,&nbsp;and&nbsp;<em>Phigenix Inc. v. Immunogen, Inc.</em>,&nbsp;the court concluded &ldquo;that RPX lacks Article III standing to appeal the Board&rsquo;s decision affirming the patentability of claims 1-31 of the &rsquo;822 patent.&rdquo;</a> Mon, 18 Jun 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/article061818/ Congratulations to Charles Macedo on being named again to IAM Strategy 300 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/inthepress061318/ <a href="http://www.iam-media.com/strategy300/Directory/Results.aspx?type=alpha&amp;key=M" target="_blank">The world&rsquo;s pre-eminent IP strategists have been named in the latest edition of IAM Strategy 300</a> &ndash; The World&rsquo;s Leading IP Strategists, published online by IAM and free to access. The unique guide lists the individuals that in-depth research, undertaken by a team based in London, Washington DC and Hong Kong, has shown to possess world-class skills in the development and roll-out of strategies that maximise the value of patents, copyright, trademarks and other IP rights. Wed, 13 Jun 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/inthepress061318/ IPWatchdog<br>Rethinking Article III Standing in IPR Appeals at the Federal Circuit<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/article6-12-2018/ <a href="http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/06/12/rethinking-article-iii-standing-ipr-appeals-federal-circuit/id=98347/" target="_blank">In 2011, as part of the American Invents Act (&ldquo;AIA&rdquo;), Congress significantly restructured the way in which previously issued patents could be challenged.&nbsp;&nbsp; In some cases, existing post-issuance proceedings, like <em>ex parte</em> reexamination and reissue proceedings, were kept intact as such proceedings existed prior to the AIA.&nbsp; In other cases, existing post-issuance proceedings, like <em>inter partes</em> reexamination, were replaced with new proceedings, such as the <em>inter partes </em>review proceedings (&ldquo;IPRs&rdquo;).&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In addition, brand new proceedings were created, such as post-grant review proceedings (&ldquo;PGRs&rdquo;), covered business method patent review proceedings (&ldquo;CBMs&rdquo;), and supplemental examination proceedings. &nbsp;In each instance, Congress made policy choices as to who could (or could not) bring and/or participate in such proceedings, and who could (or could not) raise challenges to decisions made by the government in such proceedings.&nbsp; <em>See SAS Instit. v. Iancu</em>, 584 U.S. ___ (slip op. at 6) (2018) (confirming different structure of reexamination proceedings and IPRs, and recognizing Congressional &ldquo;structural&rdquo; choices are deserving of deference; &ldquo;Congress&rsquo;s choice to depart from the model of a closely related statute is a choice neither we nor the agency may disregard.&rdquo;).</a> Tue, 12 Jun 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/article6-12-2018/ Patent Quality Initiative News<br>Rethinking Article III Standing in IPR Appeals at the Federal Circuit<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/article061218/ <div><div><a href="http://www.patentqualityinitiative.com/-/media/pqi/files/articles/rethinking-article-iii-standing-in-ipr-appeals.pdf" target="_blank">In 2011, as part of the American Invents Act (&ldquo;AIA&rdquo;), Congress significantly restructured the way in which previously issued patents could be challenged.&nbsp;In some cases, existing post-issuance proceedings, like <i>ex parte</i> reexamination and reissue proceedings, were kept intact as such proceedings existed prior to the AIA.&nbsp;In other cases, existing post-issuance proceedings, like <i>inter partes</i> reexamination, were replaced with new proceedings, such as the <i>inter partes </i>review proceedings (&ldquo;IPRs&rdquo;).&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In addition, brand new proceedings were created, such as post-grant review proceedings (&ldquo;PGRs&rdquo;), covered business method patent review proceedings (&ldquo;CBMs&rdquo;), and supplemental examination proceedings. In each instance, Congress made policy choices as to who could (or could not) bring and/or participate in such proceedings, and who could (or could not) raise challenges to decisions made by the government in such proceedings.&nbsp;<i>See SAS Instit. v. Iancu</i>, 584 U.S. ___ (slip op. at 6) (2018) (confirming different structure of reexamination proceedings and IPRs, and recognizing Congressional &ldquo;structural&rdquo; choices are deserving of deference; &ldquo;Congress&rsquo;s choice to depart from the model of a closely related statute is a choice neither we nor the agency may disregard.&rdquo;).</a></div></div> Mon, 11 Jun 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/article061218/ ARE Patent Law Alert:<br>Federal Circuit Denies Rehearing En Banc and Confirms Patent Eligibility Relies Upon Factual Determinations<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert06042018/ <div>On May 31, 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied petitions for rehearing<i> en banc</i> in both <i>Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc.,</i> 882 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2018)and <i>Berkheimer v. HP Inc.,</i> 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018), with concurrences by Judge Moore and Judge Lourie, and a dissent by Judge Reyna. In parallel <i>en banc </i>requests, HP and Green Shades had raised similar questions as to whether the &ldquo;threshold inquiry of patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. &sect; 101 is a question of law without underlying factual issues&rdquo; that would avoid dismissal on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion or may prevent summary judgment.</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div><b><u>Berkheimer</u></b></div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>By way of background, on February 8, 2018, the Federal Circuit in <i>Berkheimer, </i>a three-judge panel in an opinion written by Judge Moore overturned a grant of summary judgment of patent ineligibility after determining that fundamental aspects of a patent eligibility analysis are based upon questions of fact.</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>After the Supreme Court&rsquo;s <i>Alice </i>decision in 2014, to determine a patent&rsquo;s eligibility, courts were instructed to determine whether a patent claims abstract ideas, laws of nature or natural phenomena. If answered in the affirmative, the elements of each claim, individually or combined, are considered to determine whether they &ldquo;transform the nature of the claim&rdquo; into a patent-eligible invention. 881 F.3dat 1367. This is satisfied when the claim limitations &ldquo;involved more than performance of &lsquo;well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to the industry.&rdquo; <i>Id.</i> Therefore, <i>Berkheimer </i>held that, although patent eligibility is ultimately a question of law, it may require an analysis of underlying factual questions, as the question of whether a claim element is &ldquo;well-understood, routine and conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field is a question of fact.&rdquo; <i>Id</i>. at 1368. Since there was a factual dispute regarding specific claims as to whether they described well-understood, routine, and conventional activities, the Court vacated the summary judgment that had found the claims to be patent ineligible. <i>Id</i>. at 1369.</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div><b><u>Aatrix</u></b></div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>Similarly, on February 14, 2018, another 3-judge panel of the Court issued a split decision in <i>Aatrix Software,</i> finding that factual questions precluded dismissal of the complaint on patent eligibility grounds. The majority decision, also authored by Judge Moore vacated the &sect; 101 invalidity dismissal because the patent owner&rsquo;s proposed amended complaint adequately alleged that the claims contained an inventive concept and did not solely describe a &ldquo;well-understood, routine and conventional activity.&rdquo; 882 F.3d at 1129. Therefore, since there were factual allegations in the second amended complaint, which when accepted as true, prevent dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the district court had erred in dismissing the initial complaint without granting the patent owner leave to amend. <i>Id.</i> &nbsp;&nbsp;In a concurring and dissenting opinion by Judge Reyna, as pertinent here, he dissented with respect to &ldquo;t<span style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">he majority's broad statements on the role of factual evidence in a &sect; 101 inquiry. Our precedent is clear that the &sect; 101 inquiry is a legal question.&nbsp;</span><i>See&nbsp;</i><i><span style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp.,</span></i><span style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">&nbsp;850 F.3d 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2017). In a manner contrary to that standard, the majority opinion attempts to shoehorn a significant factual component into the&nbsp;</span><i>Alice</i><span style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">&nbsp;&sect; 101 analysis.&rdquo; <i>&nbsp;Id</i>. at 1130.</span></div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div><b><u>The Petitions for Rehearing</u></b></div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>The losing defendants in both <i>Berkheimer</i> and <i>Aatrix </i>sought rehearing en banc to address similar questions.</div> <div><br />The two questions raised by HP Inc. in <i>Berkheimer </i>were:<br /><br /><div style="margin-left: 40px;">1.&nbsp;Is the threshold inquiry of patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. &sect; 101 a question of law without underlying factual issues that might prevent summary judgment?</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div style="margin-left: 40px;">2.&nbsp;Is the appropriate inquiry under&nbsp;<i>Alice&nbsp;</i>step 2 whether the claims transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible application, or merely &ldquo;whether the invention describes well-understood, routine and conventional activities&rdquo;?</div></div> <div><br />Similarly, Green Shades Software, Inc., the patent challenger in Aatrix, raised the following question:<br />Is the threshold inquiry of patent-eligibility under 35 U.S.C. &sect; 101 a question of law without underlying factual issues based on complaint allegations pled to avoid dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)?<br />&nbsp;</div> <div><b><u>The Per Curiam Orders Denying The Petitions</u></b></div> <div><b><u>&nbsp;</u></b></div> <div>In both <i>Berkheimer</i> and <i>Aatrix</i>, the Court issued a short <i>per curiam</i> order denying each petition for rehearing, rehearing en banc and ordered a date for the mandate to issue.&nbsp;Each order was accompanied by three decisions which offer insight into the current court&rsquo;s view on the role of fact finding in the context of patent-eligibility rulings.</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div><b><u>Judge Moore&rsquo;s Concurrence, joined by Judges Dyk, O&rsquo;Malley, Taranto and Stoll</u></b></div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>Judge Moore (the author of <i>Berkheimer</i> and the majority in <i>Aatrix</i>) issued a concurring opinion, which was joined by Judges Dyk, O&rsquo;Malley, Taranto and Stoll to reinforce her original decision.&nbsp;Judge Moore&rsquo;s concurrence observed, &ldquo;<i>Berkheimer</i> and <i>Aatrix</i> stand for the unremarkable proposition that whether a claim element or combination of elements would have been well-understood, routine, and conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field at a particular point in time is a question of fact.&rdquo;&nbsp;<i>Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc.</i>, No. 2017-1452, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 14395, at *2; <i>Berkheimer v. HP Inc.</i>, No. 2017-1437, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 14388, at *3.[1]Thus, while the ultimate question of patent eligibility is one of law, it may contain underlying issues of fact, which may require &ldquo;weighing evidence to determine whether the additional limitations beyond the abstract idea, natural phenomenon, or law of nature would have been well-understood, routine, and conventional.&rdquo; <i>Id. </i>at *3-4.</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>In support of this conclusion, Judge Moore&rsquo;s concurrence explains that as a factual question, normal procedural standards for fact questions must apply, and that the Court is &ldquo;not free to create specialized rules for patent law that contradict well-established, general legal principles.&rdquo; <i>Id</i>.at *5. Therefore, &ldquo;if there is a genuine dispute of material fact, Rule 56 requires that summary judgment be denied.&rdquo; <i>Id. </i>at *5. &nbsp;Thus, if patent eligibility is challenged in a motion to dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the standard consistently applied in all other areas of law must also be applied here. <i>Id. </i>at *7. In other words, the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim must be denied if &ldquo;in the light most favorable to the plaintiff...the complaint states any legally cognizable claim for relief.&rdquo; <i>Id</i>. at *7-8.</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>Ultimately, as found by the panels, Judge Moore&rsquo;s concurrence concludes, whether a claim element is well-understood, routine and conventional is a question of fact, and <i>Berkheimer </i>and <i>Aatrix</i> &ldquo;merely hold that it must be answered under the normal procedural standards, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure standards for motions to dismiss or summary judgment and the Federal Rules of Evidence standards for admissions and judicial notice.&rdquo; <i>Id</i>. at *12-13.</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div><b><u>Judge Lourie Concurrence, joined by Judge Newman</u></b></div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>In a concurrence by Judge Lourie, and joined by Judge Newman, Judge Lourie explains his belief that &ldquo;the law needs clarification by higher authority...to work its way out of what so many in the innovation field consider are &sect; 101 problems.&rdquo; <i>Id.</i> at *13. Judge Lourie&rsquo;s concurrence stated that, &ldquo;even if it was decided wrongly...it would not work us out of the current &sect; 101 dilemma,&rdquo; as expresses his views the problem as stemming from the 2-step &ldquo;inventive concept&rdquo;&nbsp;patent eligibility analysis as set out in <i>Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc</i>. Thus, he asserts that resolution of patent eligibility issues require higher intervention. <i>Id</i>. at *15, *18-19.</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div><b><u>Judge Reyna Dissent</u></b></div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>Judge Reyna, in dissent, argued that the <i>Aatrix </i>and <i>Berkheimer </i>decisions significantly alter the &sect; 101 analysis &ldquo;by presenting patent eligibility under &sect; 101 as predominantly a question of fact&rdquo; and offer no guidance to the questions they raise. <i>Id</i>. at *20, *33-34.&nbsp;Thus, he views that the inaction taken by denying the petitions has prevented the Court &ldquo;from exploring the important questions&rdquo; raised by both parties in their respective petitions for rehearing <i>en banc</i>. <i>Id</i>. at *33.&nbsp;</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div><b><u>Practical Significance</u></b></div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>For now, at least five members of the Court have endorsed the proposition that even though patent-eligibility may be a question of law, it may turn on underlying factual determinations which may not be summarily decided.&nbsp;&nbsp;While clearly at least Judge Reyna disagrees, he was unable to garner support from any of the remaining members of the Court (Chief Judge Prost, or Judges Wallach, Chen or Hughes), at least this time around.&nbsp;We can expect that Patent Office and lower courts to continue to apply <i>Berkheimer</i> and <i>Aatrix </i>for the foreseeable future.</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>It will be interesting to see how whether Congress or the Supreme Court will answer Judge Lourie&rsquo;s pleas to a &ldquo;higher authority&rdquo; to reconsider the law of patent-eligibility.</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>We will continue to monitor the law of patent-eligibility.&nbsp;In the meantime, please feel free to contact one of our attorneys regarding the issues raised in this case.</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>&nbsp;<span style="font-size:8.5pt;Verdana">* <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/cmacedo/" target="_blank">Charles R. Macedo</a> is a Partner and Chandler Sturm is a Law Clerk at <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/" target="_blank">Amster, Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP</a>.&nbsp;Their practice focuses on all facets of the intellectual property law, including patent, trademark and copyright.&nbsp;Mr. Macedo may be contacted at&nbsp;</span><a href="mailto:cmacedo@arelaw.com"><span style="font-size: 8.5pt; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">cmacedo@arelaw.com</span></a><span style="font-size:8.5pt;Verdana">.</span></div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div><div id="ftn1"><div>[1] Given the similarity in questions raised, identical opinions were filed in response to the Aatrix&nbsp;and Berkheimer petitions for rehearing en banc. All following citations refer to <i>Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc.</i>, No. 2017-1452, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 14395 (Fed. Cir. May 31, 2018).</div></div></div><div><div id="ftn1"><div>&nbsp;</div></div></div> Mon, 04 Jun 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert06042018/ In The Press:<br>Askeladden LLC Submits Another Amicus Brief Advocating Against Tribal Sovereign Immunity for PTAB Proceedings<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/inthepress052218/ <p><strong>IPWatchdog reports</strong> -- <a href="http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/05/22/askeladden-submits-amicus-brief-advocating-against-tribal-sovereign-immunity/id=97539/" target="_blank">Askeladden again submitted an amicus brief to the Federal Circuit on May 17, 2018 supporting the PTAB&rsquo;s decision below</a>.<br /><br />A copy of that amicus brief&nbsp;<a href="http://www.patentqualityinitiative.com/-/media/pqi/files/amicus-briefs/table/st-regis-v-mylan--askeladden-amicus-brief.pdf?la=en" target="_blank" rel="noopener">is available here</a>.<span style="font-size: small;"><br /><br /></span>Askeladden is represented by Amster Rothstein and Ebenstein LLP.</p> Tue, 22 May 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/inthepress052218/ Practical Law:<br>Appealing Patent Trial and Appeal Board Final Written Decisions<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/practicallaw050218/ <div><strong>REVISED&nbsp; May 21, 2018 --</strong>&nbsp;<a href="/images/file/Appealing%20Patent%20Trial%20and%20Appeal%20Board%20Final%20Written%20Decisions%20052118.pdf" target="_blank">Appealing Patent Trial and Appeal&nbsp;Board Final Written Decisions</a></div> Mon, 21 May 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/practicallaw050218/ Practical Law:<br>Understanding PTAB Trials: Key Milestones in IPR, PGR, and CBM Proceedings<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/practicallaw050118/ <strong>REVISED&nbsp; May 21, 2018 --&nbsp;</strong><a href="/images/file/Understanding%20PTAB%20Trials-%20Key%20Milestones%20in%20IPR,%20PGR,%20and%20CBM%20Proceeding%20052118.pdf" target="_blank">Understanding PTAB Trials: Key Milestones in IPR, PGR, and CBM Proceedings</a> Mon, 21 May 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/practicallaw050118/ In The Press:<br> Askeladden Advocates against Tribal Sovereign Immunity for Inter Partes Review Proceedings<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/inthepress05212018/ Patent Quality Initiative reports on Amicus brief&nbsp;finding tribal sovereign immunity inapplicable to inter partes review (IPR)<br /><br />Askeladden is represented by Amster Rothstein and Ebenstein LLP.<br /><br /><a href="http://www.patentqualityinitiative.com/news/press-releases/news-items/tribal-sovereign-immunity-release" target="_blank">Available Here.</a><br type="_moz" /> Mon, 21 May 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/inthepress05212018/ In The Press: <br>IPLaw360 Reports on Federal Circuit Asking Google to Respond to Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/inthepress5212018/ <div><em><span style="font-size: 9pt;">IP</span></em><em>&nbsp;Law360</em>,&nbsp;<em><span style="font-size: 9pt;">May 21, 2018</span></em></div><div><span style="font-size: 9pt;"> <br /> <span style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">Fed. Circ. Asks Google Whether Full Court Should Eye Patents<br /><br />Law360 Reports on Federal Circuit Asking Google to Respond to Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc</span></span></div><div><span style="font-size: 9pt;"><span style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">Law360 reported on The Federal Circuit on Friday asked Google to weigh in on a patent licensing company&rsquo;s request for the entire court to review whether a panel erred in holding that the Patent Trial and Appeal Board goofed on its construction of a claim term included in several media search patents challenged by the tech giant.</span></span></div> <div align="center" style="text-align:center"><hr size="3" width="100%" noshade="" align="center" /></div> <div><span style=" font-size: 9pt;">Network-1 is represented by <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/cmacedo/" target="_blank">Charles R. Macedo</a> and <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/jhahm/" target="_blank">Jung S. Hahm</a> of <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/" target="_blank">Amster Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP</a>, and Gregory S. Dovel and Sean Luner of <a href="https://www.dovel.com/" target="_blank">Dovel &amp; Luner LLP</a>.<br /><br type="_moz" /></span></div><div><span style=" font-size: 9pt;"><a href="https://www.law360.com/articles/1045358/fed-circ-asks-google-whether-full-court-should-eye-patents" target="_blank">Click here to read the full article</a>. (subscription required)</span></div> Mon, 21 May 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/inthepress5212018/ Brief for Amicus Curiae Askeladden L.L.C. in Support of Appellees http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/amicus05172018/ Click to download PDF:&nbsp;<a href="/images/file/Amicus%20Brief%20-%20Askeladden%20-%20Saint%20Regis%20Mohawk%20Tribe%20v_%20Mylan%20Pharmaceuticals%20Inc_.pdf" target="_blank">Brief for Amicus Curiae Askeladden L.L.C. in Support of Appelleee&nbsp;<a href="/images/file/Amicus%20Brief%20-%20Askeladden%20-%20Saint%20Regis%20Mohawk%20Tribe%20v_%20Mylan%20Pharmaceuticals%20Inc_.pdf" target="_blank"><div style="display: inline !important;">&nbsp;in <i>St. Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. </i>Nos. 2018-1638, -1639, -1640, -1641, -1642, 1643 (Fed. Cir. filed May 18, 2018)</div></a></a> Thu, 17 May 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/amicus05172018/ IP Watchdog<br>Federal Circuit Asked to Reconsider IPR Ruling in Context of Database Search Algorithms http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/article051118/ <div><a href="http://www.ipwatchdog.com/author/charmac/"><img border="0" id="_x0000_i1025" src="http://www.ipwatchdog.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/pic_cmacedo-80x100.jpg" scale="0" alt="" /></a></div> <div><a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/cmacedo/" target="_blank">Charles R. Macedo<br /></a>Amster Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP</div><div>&nbsp;</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>IP Watchdog reports -- On May 9, 2018, Network-1 Technologies, Inc. filed a combined petition for panel rehearing or rehearing en banc with the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, requesting reconsideration of the panel&rsquo;s decision in context of database search algorithms in a consolidated appeal from&nbsp;<em>inter partes</em>&nbsp;review decisions relating to four of Network-1&rsquo;s patents.&nbsp; Gregory S. Dovel and Sean Luner of Dovel &amp; Luner, LLP, and Charles R. Macedo and Jung S. Hahm of Amster, Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP were authors on the brief.<br /><br />For the full article, please see&nbsp;<a href="http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/05/10/federal-circuit-asked-reconsider-ipr-ruling-context-database-search-algorithms/id=97077/" target="_blank">http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/05/10/federal-circuit-asked-reconsider-ipr-ruling-context-database-search-algorithms/id=97077/</a>&nbsp;</div> Fri, 11 May 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/article051118/ NETWORK-1's COMBINED PETITION FOR PANEL REHEARING OR REHEARING EN BANC http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/amicus051018/ Click here to download pdf:&nbsp;<a href="/images/file/Network-1%20Petition%20for%20Rehearing%20or%20Rehearing%20En%20Banc.pdf" target="_blank">GOOGLELLC, Appellant, V. NETWORK-I TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Appellee</a> Thu, 10 May 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/amicus051018/ In The Press:<br> Beth M. Kotran – Ferrero North America<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/inthepress042718/ Vanguard&nbsp; Law Magazine -- Written by:&nbsp;<a href="mailto:ncote@truelinepublishing.com?subject=Vanguard%20Inquiry%20-%20Beth%20M.%20Kotran%20%E2%80%93%20Ferrero%20North%20America">Neil Cote</a>/Produced by:&nbsp;<a href="mailto:RFields@truelinepublishing.com?subject=Vanguard%20Inquiry%20-%20Beth%20M.%20Kotran%20%E2%80%93%20Ferrero%20North%20America">Ross Fields<br /></a><br /><div><div>AR&amp;E is proud of our alumna Beth Kotran, general counsel for the North American operations of Ferrero, the worldwide confectionery company which brings us NUTELLA, TIC TAC, KINDER, FERRERO ROCHER, and many more. Beth&rsquo;s accomplishments are featured in this month&rsquo;s edition of Vanguard Law Magazine.&nbsp; The article can be seen at &nbsp;<a href="https://goo.gl/NyZLUn" target="_blank">https://goo.gl/NyZLUn</a></div></div><br /> Thu, 26 Apr 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/inthepress042718/ ARE Patent Law Alert:<br>IN SAS INSTITUTE INC. V. IANCU, U.S. SUPREME COURT DETERMINES THAT PTAB MUST ISSUE A FINAL WRITTEN DECISION ADDRESSING ALL CHALLENGED CLAIMS IN IPR PROCEEDINGS<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert042518/ <div>On April 24, 2018, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a 5-4 opinion in <i>SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu</i>, No. 16-969, 584 U.S. ____ (2018).&nbsp;In this Decision, the Court reversed the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (&ldquo;Federal Circuit&rdquo;) and held that &ldquo;the petitioner in an <i>inter partes </i>review is entitled to a decision on all the claims it has challenged.&rdquo; Slip op. at 10-11.<br /><i><br />SAS</i> addressed an important question regarding U.S. Patent Trial and Appeal Board (&ldquo;PTAB&rdquo;) practice in issuing a final written decision:&nbsp;&ldquo;When the Patent Office initiates an inter partes review, must it resolve <i>all</i> of the claims in the case, or may it choose to limit its review to only <i>some</i> of them?&rdquo;&nbsp;<i>Id</i>. at 1 (emphasis in original).&nbsp;<br /><br />The relevant statute addressed by the <i>SAS </i>Court, as applied to <i>inter partes</i> review (&ldquo;IPR&rdquo;) proceedings, provides:<br />&nbsp;</div><div style="margin-left: 40px;">(a) Final Written Decision.&mdash;<br />If an <i>inter partes</i> review is instituted and not dismissed under this chapter, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board <b><i>shall</i></b> issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of <b><i>any</i></b> patent claim challenged by the petitioner and <b><i>any</i></b> new claim added under section 316(d).</div><div><br />35 U.S.C. &sect; 318(a) (emphasis added).&nbsp;<br /><br />The majority opinion authored by Justice Gorsuch, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas and Alito, concluded that 35 U.S.C. &sect; 318(a) provides a &ldquo;clear&rdquo; answer as &ldquo;any&rdquo; in this statutory provision means &ldquo;every.&rdquo;&nbsp;Slip op. at 1.&nbsp;The majority opinion focused heavily on the plain language of the statute and determined that &ldquo;everything in the statute before [the Court] confirms that [petitioner] is entitled to a final written decision addressing<b><i> all of the claims it has challenged</i></b> and nothing suggests [that the Court] lack[s] the power to say so[.]&rdquo; <i>Id</i>. at 14.<br /><br />By way of background, this case began when SAS Institute Inc. (&ldquo;SAS&rdquo;) petitioned for IPR of ComplementSoft, LLC&rsquo;s (&ldquo;ComplementSoft&rdquo;) software patent. <i>Id.</i> at 3.&nbsp;In its petition, SAS alleged that all 16 of the patent&rsquo;s claims were unpatentable. <i>Id.&nbsp;</i>The PTAB concluded that SAS likely would succeed with respect to at least one of the claims and that an IPR was warranted. <i>Id.</i> at 3-4.&nbsp;However, the PTAB did not institute review on all of the challenged claims in the petition, and instead, only instituted review on some of the claims while denying review on the rest. <i>Id. </i>at 4.&nbsp;The final written decision ultimately issued by the PTAB did not address those claims on which the PTAB refused to institute review. <i>Id.</i>&nbsp;<br /><br />SAS appealed to the Federal Circuit, arguing that 35 U.S.C. &sect; 318(a) required the PTAB to decide the patentability of <b><i>every</i></b> claim a petitioner challenges in its petition, not just some. <i>Id.</i>&nbsp;The Federal Circuit rejected this argument. <i>Id.&nbsp;</i>The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the question. <i>Id.</i><br /><br />The majority of the Court found that the plain language of the text of 35 U.S.C. &sect; 318(a) &ldquo;supplies a ready answer.&rdquo; <i>Id. </i>In particular, the Court focused on interpretation of the terms &ldquo;shall&rdquo; and &ldquo;any&rdquo; in the statute. <i>Id.</i>&nbsp;While &ldquo;shall&rdquo; tends to &ldquo;impose[] a nondiscretionary duty,&rdquo; the &ldquo;any&rdquo; carries a more &ldquo;expansive meaning.&rdquo; <i>Id. </i>(citations omitted).&nbsp;Therefore, the Court determined that the statute requires that &ldquo;the Board <b><i>must</i></b> address <b><i>every</i></b> claim the petitioner has challenged.&rdquo; <i>Id. </i>at 5 (emphasis added).<br /><br />In reaching the decision, the Court rejected the notion that the Director of the Patent Office (&ldquo;Director&rdquo;) retains a discretionary &ldquo;partial institution&rdquo; power since such power does not appear anywhere in the statute.&nbsp;<i>Id</i>.&nbsp;<br /><br />In addition, the Court rejected the Director&rsquo;s argument that the statutory provision on institution of <i>inter partes</i> review under 35 U.S.C. &sect; 314(a) supports the Director&rsquo;s &ldquo;partial institution&rdquo; power:&nbsp;&ldquo;[W]hile &sect;314(a) invests the Director with discretion on the question <i>whether</i> to institute review, it doesn&rsquo;t follow that the statute affords him discretion regarding <i>what</i> claims that review will encompass.&rdquo;&nbsp;Slip op. at 8 (emphasis in or<br /><br />The Court also rejected the Director&rsquo;s policy argument on efficiency of partial institution, noting that &ldquo;[p]olicy arguments are properly addressed to Congress, not this Court.&rdquo;&nbsp;<i>Id</i>. at 10.&nbsp;<br /><br />The Court further rejected the Director&rsquo;s argument that the statute is ambiguous on the propriety of the partial institution practice:&nbsp;&ldquo;[A]fter applying traditional tools of interpretation here, we are left with no uncertainty that could warrant deference&rdquo; to the Director&rsquo;s interpretation under <i>Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc</i>., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).&nbsp;Slip op. at 11-12.&nbsp;&ldquo;There is no room in this [statutory] scheme for a wholly unmentioned &lsquo;partial institution&rsquo; power that lets the Director select only some challenged claims for decision.&rdquo;&nbsp;<i>Id</i>. at 12.&nbsp;<br /><br />Finally, the Court rejected the Director&rsquo;s argument that judicial review of the question of whether the &ldquo;partial institution&rdquo; practice is permitted under the statute is foreclosed under 35 U.S.C. &sect; 314(d) and previous Supreme Court precedent in <i>Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee</i>, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016).&nbsp;The Court determined that the Directors &ldquo;overread[] both the statute and [the Court&rsquo;s] precedent,&rdquo; and held that judicial review remains available to determine whether the Director exceeded his statutory authority by limiting inter partes review to fewer than all of the claims the petitioner challenged.&nbsp;Slip op. at 13-14.<br /><br />Ultimately, the Court decided that &ldquo;everything in the statute before [the Court] confirms that [petitioner] is entitled to a final written decision addressing all of the claims it has challenged and nothing suggests [that the Court] lack[s] the power to say so[.]&rdquo; <i>Id.</i> at 14.<br /><br />In a dissent, Justice Ginsburg described the majority&rsquo;s reading of the statute as &ldquo;wooden&rdquo; and questioned why the statute is read so narrowly. &nbsp;Ginsburg slip op. at 1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).&nbsp;Justice Ginsburg then fully supported Justice Breyer&rsquo;s dissenting opinion. <i>Id.</i>&nbsp;<br /><br />In a separate dissent, Justice Breyer argued that the statute is ambiguous and that the PTO&rsquo;s interpretation is reasonable.&nbsp;Breyer slip op. at 1 (Breyer, J., dissenting).&nbsp;He explained that, &ldquo;there is a gap, the agency possesses gap-filling authority, and it filled the gap with a regulation that . . . is a reasonable exercise of that authority.&rdquo; <i>Id.</i> at 10.<br /><br />We will continue to monitor developments of this case on remand and the resulting changes in the PTAB practice and procedures.&nbsp;In the meantime, please feel free to contact one of our attorneys regarding the issues raised by this case.<br /><br />* Charles R. Macedo is a Partner and Christopher Lisiewski is a Law Clerk at Amster, Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP.&nbsp;Their practice focuses on all facets of the intellectual property law, including patent, trademark and copyright.&nbsp;They may be contacted at <a href="mailto:cmacedo@arelaw.com">cmacedo@arelaw.com</a> and <a href="mailto:clisiewski@arelaw.com">clisiewski@arelaw.com</a>.</div> Wed, 25 Apr 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert042518/ In The Press:<br>IPWATCHDOG Turns To Partner Charles R. Macedo For Insight on SAS Institute Decision<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/inthepress042618/ <p><b><font size="6"><span style="font-size: small;">SAS: When the Patent Office institutes IPR it must decide patentability of all challenged claims</span></font></b></p><div>By&nbsp;<a href="http://www.ipwatchdog.com/author/gene-quinn-2/"><strong>Gene Quinn</strong></a>&nbsp;&amp;&nbsp;<a href="http://www.ipwatchdog.com/author/rquinn06/"><strong>Renee C. Quinn</strong></a>&nbsp;<br /><br />Yesterday the United States Supreme Court issued decisions in both&nbsp;<a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-712_87ad.pdf" target="_blank"><em>Oil States v. Green Energy</em></a>and&nbsp;<a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-969_f2qg.pdf" target="_blank"><em>SAS Institute v. Iancu</em></a>. In Oil States the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of inter partes review (see&nbsp;<a href="http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/04/24/industry-reaction-oil-states/id=96296/">here</a>,&nbsp;<a href="http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/04/24/scotus-says-patents-government-franchise-not-vested-property-right/id=96324/">here</a>&nbsp;and&nbsp;<a href="http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/04/24/supreme-court-issues-much-anticipated-oil-states-sas-decisions/id=96302/">here</a>). In&nbsp;<em>SAS Institute</em>, a 5-4 majority ruled that there is no authorization in the statute for the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) to partially institute a petition for inter partes review. Thus, the Supreme Court held that when the Patent Office institutes an inter partes review it must decide the patentability of all of the claims the petitioner has challenged.<br /><br />To provide instant reaction to the Supreme Court&rsquo;s decision in&nbsp;<em>SAS Institute</em>&nbsp;we&rsquo;ve reached out to an All-Star panel of industry experts for their take on this important decision. Their analysis follows.</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>***</div> <div><img border="0" width="150" height="150" id="_x0000_i1025" src="http://www.ipwatchdog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/charles-macedo-150x150.jpg" size-thumbnail="" scale="0" alt="" /><br /><a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/cmacedo/" target="_blank">Charles R. Macedo</a><br /> Amster Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP</div> <div><br />In&nbsp;<i>SAS Institute v. Iancu</i>, a split Supreme Court found that &ldquo;When the Patent Office institutes an inter partes review, it must decide the patentability of all of the claims the petitioner has chal&shy;lenged.&rdquo;&nbsp; The majority rejected the current practice of the PTAB to grant partial institutions, as extra-statutory.&nbsp; Based on the plain terms of the statute: the Patent Office must &ldquo;issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of&nbsp;<i>any&nbsp;</i>patent claim challenged by the peti&shy;tioner.&rdquo; 35 U. S. C. &sect;318(a) (emphasis added), the Court recognized that &ldquo;any&rdquo; means &ldquo;every&rdquo;.&nbsp;&nbsp; From the majority&rsquo;s reading the statute: &ldquo;In all these ways, the statute tells us that the petitioner&rsquo;s contentions, not the Director&rsquo;s discretion, define the scope of the litigation all the way from institution through to conclusion.&rdquo; While the opinion suggests that upon institution all grounds raised,&nbsp; in addition to each claim challenged, must be addressed in the Final Written Decision,, the decision is vague in addressing this aspect current PTAB practice.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Perhaps next term the Supreme Court will answer that question.<br /><em><br />Charles Macedo is a partner with&nbsp;Amster Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP. He&nbsp;litigates in all areas of intellectual property law, including patent, trademark and copyright law, with a special emphasis in complex litigation and appellate work.</em><br /><a href="http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/04/25/sas-patent-office-institutes-ipr/id=96297/" target="_blank"><br />http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/04/25/sas-patent-office-institutes-ipr/id=96297/</a></div> Wed, 25 Apr 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/inthepress042618/ In The Press: <br>PTAB Finds N5 Technologies Patent to be Unpatentable Following Challenge from Askeladden<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/inthepress042518/ <p>Askeladden successfully proves that all eleven claims of the mobile authentication patent were unpatentable.</p><div>Askeladden is represented by Amster Rothstein and Ebenstein LLP.<br /><br /><a href="http://www.patentqualityinitiative.com/news/press-releases/news-items/n5-final-written-decision" target="_blank">Available Here.</a></div><p>&nbsp;</p> Wed, 25 Apr 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/inthepress042518/ In The Press:<br> IPWatchdog Turns To Partner Charles R. Macedo For His Insight Into SCOTUS Decision in Oil States v. Green Energy<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/inthepress042418/ <p><b><font size="5"><a href="https://ipwatchdog.us10.list-manage.com/track/click?u=6ee129932f5c7fc87034903d8&amp;id=15f963a9f3&amp;e=32162e535d" target="_blank"><span style="font-size: small;">Industry Reaction to Supreme Court Decision in Oil States v. Green Energy</span></a></font></b><br /><em><br />By Gene Quinn &amp; Renee C. Quinn on Apr 24, 2018 06:17 pm</em><br /><br />Earlier today the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in <i>Oil States v. Green Energy</i>, finding that inter partes review is&nbsp;constitutional both under Article III and the Seventh Amendment to the&nbsp;United States Constitution. In a 7-2 decision, the Court determined&nbsp;that patents are a government franchise that are subject to review by&nbsp;the Patent Office even after granting, and can be revoked at any time.&nbsp;<br /><br />***<br /><br />In order to get a diverse array of views, we held open comments through early evening for this instant reaction piece. We will have much more to write in the coming days and weeks. Nevertheless, what follows is reaction to the Supreme Court Oil States decision from a distinguished panel of industry experts.<br /><br />***</p> <div><img border="0" width="150" height="150" id="_x0000_i1025" src="http://www.ipwatchdog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/charles-macedo-150x150.jpg" alt="" /><a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/cmacedo/" target="_blank">Charles R. Macedo</a><br /> <br />Amster Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP<br /><br />In&nbsp;<i>Oil States</i>, the seven member majority of the Supreme Court confirmed (at least for now) the constitutionality of inter partes review proceedings, as set up by Congress in the American Invents Act of 2011.&nbsp; The Court reaffirmed that the Patent Trial and Appeals Board &mdash; an adjudicatory body within the PTO created to conduct inter partes reviews, has authority to examine the validity of a patent which was previously issued by the PTO.&nbsp;&nbsp; The Court found &ldquo;Inter partes review falls squarely within the public-right doctrine&rdquo;, as it &ldquo;is simply a reconsideration of that grant, and Congress has permissibly reserved the PTO&rsquo;s authority to conduct that reconsideration.&nbsp;&nbsp; Thus, the PTO can do so without violating Article III.&rdquo;&nbsp; The Court&rsquo;s emphasis of the &ldquo;narrowness of our holding&rdquo; does leave the door opened a crack to consider other constitutional challenges that don&rsquo;t turn on a public right vs. private right distinction. At least as of today,&nbsp;<i>Oil States</i>&nbsp;leaves intact inter partes reviews, and other post-issuance proceedings before the USPTO.<br /><br />Available at <a href="http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/04/24/industry-reaction-oil-states/id=96296/">http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/04/24/industry-reaction-oil-states/id=96296/</a>&nbsp;</div> Tue, 24 Apr 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/inthepress042418/ Patent Law Alert:<br>In Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, U.S. Supreme Court Held That Inter Partes Review by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board Does Not Violate Article III or the Seventh Amendment<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert042618/ <div>On April 24, 2018, the United States Supreme Court issued its much-anticipated decision in <i>Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene&rsquo;s Energy Group, LLC</i>, affirming the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit&rsquo;s judgment that <i>inter partes</i> review does not violate Article III or the Seventh Amendment.&nbsp;This 7-2 majority opinion of the Court was delivered by Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor and Kagan.&nbsp;Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts joined.<br /><br />In the <i>inter partes</i> review proceeding below, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (&ldquo;PTAB&rdquo;) issued a final written decision holding the challenged claims of the patent owned by Oil States Energy Services, LLC (&ldquo;Oil States&rdquo;) unpatentable.&nbsp;In appealing from the PTAB&rsquo;s decision, Oil States had challenged the constitutionality of <i>inter partes</i> review, arguing that &ldquo;actions to revoke a patent must be tried in an Article III court before a jury.&rdquo;&nbsp;Slip op. at 5.&nbsp;The Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB&rsquo;s decision, as it had already rejected such constitutional arguments in a different case, <i>MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co.</i>, 812 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2015).&nbsp;The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether <i>inter partes</i> review violates Article III or the Seventh Amendment and concluded that it violates neither.&nbsp;<br /><br />First, the majority of the Supreme Court determined that &ldquo;[i]nter partes review falls squarely within the public rights doctrine.&rdquo;&nbsp;Slip op. at 6.</div><div style="margin-left: 40px;"><br />This Court has recognized, and the parties do not dispute, that the decision to <i>grant</i> a patent is a matter involving public rights--specifically, the grant of a public franchise.&nbsp;Inter partes review is simply a reconsideration of that grant, and Congress has permissibly reserved the PTO&rsquo;s authority to conduct that reconsideration.&nbsp;Thus, the PTO can do so without violating Article III.<br /><i><br />Id</i>. at 6-7 (emphasis in original).&nbsp;</div><div><br />Next, the majority opinion determined that the prior Court decisions cited by Oil States as recognizing patent rights as the &ldquo;private property of the patentee&rdquo; do not contradict its conclusion that <i>inter partes</i> review does not violate Article III.&nbsp;The Court noted that those precedents were decided under the Patent Act of 1870, which did not provide for any post-issuance administrative review, and held that &ldquo;[t]hose precedents . . . are best read as a description of the statutory scheme that existed at that time.&rdquo;&nbsp;<i>Id</i>. at 11.&nbsp;<br /><br />The majority opinion also held that, contrary to the contention by Oil States and the dissent, &ldquo;history does not establish that patent validity is a matter that, &lsquo;from its nature,&rsquo; must be decided by a court.&rdquo;&nbsp;<i>Id</i>. at 12 (citation omitted).&nbsp;</div><div style="margin-left: 40px;"><br />Historical practice is not decisive here because matters governed by the public rights doctrine &lsquo;from their nature&rsquo; can be resolved in multiple ways: Congress can &lsquo;reserve to itself the power to decide,&rsquo; &lsquo;delegate that power to executive officers,&rsquo; or &lsquo;commit it to judicial tribunals.&rsquo;&nbsp;That Congress chose the courts in the past does not foreclose its choice of the PTO today.<br /><i><br /></i></div><div><i>Id</i>. at 14-15 (citation omitted).&nbsp;<br /><br />The Court also rejected Oil States&rsquo;s argument that <i>inter partes</i> review violates Article III based on the similarities between the various procedures used in inter partes review and typical court procedures.&nbsp;</div><div style="margin-left: 40px;"><br />But this Court has never adopted a &ldquo;looks like&rdquo; test to determine if an adjudication has improperly occurred outside of an Article III court.&nbsp;The fact that an agency uses court-like procedures does not necessarily mean it is exercising the judicial power.<br /><i><br />Id</i>. at 15 (citation omitted).&nbsp;</div><div><br />Finally, the majority opinion held that <i>inter partes</i> review does not violate the Seventh Amendment, since &ldquo;when Congress properly assigns a matter to adjudication in a non-Article III tribunal, the Seventh Amendment poses no independent bar to the adjudication of that action by a nonjury factfinder.&rdquo;&nbsp;<i>Id</i>. at 17 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).&nbsp;<br /><br />Emphasizing the narrowness of its holding, the majority opinion noted that it only addressed the constitutionality of <i>inter partes</i> review and that it did not consider &ldquo;whether inter partes review would be constitutional without any sort of intervention by a court at any stage of the proceedings.&rdquo;&nbsp;<i>Id</i>. at 16 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).&nbsp;The Court also noted that &ldquo;Oil States does not challenge the retroactive application of inter partes review, even though that procedure was not in place when its patent issued.&rdquo;&nbsp;<i>Id</i>. at 17.&nbsp;The Court also cautioned against misconstruing its decision &ldquo;as suggesting that patents are not property for purposes of the Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause.&rdquo;&nbsp;<i>Id</i>. (citations omitted).&nbsp;<br /><br />We expect that the foregoing and other open issues will likely come up in the future and will continue to monitor the PTAB, Federal Circuit and Supreme Court for the latest developments in the constitutional issues involving <i>inter partes</i> review.<br /><br />*Charles R. Macedo is a partner and Jung S. Hahm is senior counsel at Amster, Rothstein and Ebenstein LLP.&nbsp;Their practice specializes in intellectual property issues, including litigating patent, trademark and other intellectual property disputes.&nbsp;They may be reached at <a href="mailto:cmacedo@arelaw.com">cmacedo@arelaw.com</a> and <a href="mailto:jhahm@arelaw.com">jhahm@arelaw.com</a>.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</div> Tue, 24 Apr 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert042618/ ARE Patent Law Alert:<br>“Diagnose and Treat” Claims Held Patentable By Federal Circuit - A Path Forward For Patentability<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert042018/ <div>On April 13, 2018, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), held in a 2-1 split decision in <i>Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. West-Ward Pharmaceuticals</i>, No. 2016-2707 &amp; 2016-2708 that claims directed to a specified method of treatment based on a previously-performed, specified diagnosis are patentable.<br /><br />By way of background, since the 2012 U.S. Supreme Court decision in <i>Mayo</i> (<i>Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. </i>132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012))<i>, </i>the ability to obtain patentprotection in the United States for diagnostic methods has been greatly curtailed.&nbsp;Historically, judge-made law has long prohibited patents directed to a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea.&nbsp;However, in <i>Mayo</i>, the&nbsp; Supreme Court indicated that something more is required to transform a newly discovered practical application of a law of nature into a valid method claim, without providing much guidance as to what that something more&nbsp; has to be.&nbsp;In May 2016, the U.S. Patent Office issued &ldquo;Subject Matter Eligibility Examples: Life Sciences&rdquo; taking into account the Mayo decision and other relevant judicial decisions (<a href="https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-may-2016-ex.pdf">https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-may-2016-ex.pdf</a>). The examples included hypothetical methods that could be considered as patent-eligible, in particular claims 5 and 6 of Example 29 directed to diagnosing and treating a hypothetical disease (&ldquo;julitis&rdquo;) in a subject.&nbsp;We have previously discussed enforceability issues of two-actor diagnose and treat claims (https://www.law360.com/ip/articles/996376/exploring-viability-of-diagnose-and-treat-method-claims).<br /><br />The patent-in-suit in Vanda was U.S. Patent No. 8,586,610 (&ldquo;the &lsquo;610 patent&rdquo;).&nbsp;Claim 1 is directed to:<br /><br />1. A method for treating a patient with iloperidone, wherein the patient is suffering from schizophrenia, the method comprising the steps of:<br />&nbsp;</div><div style="margin-left: 40px;">determining whether the patient is a CYP2D6 poor metabolizer by: obtaining or having obtained a biological sample from the patient; and performing or having performed a genotyping assay on the biological sample to determine if the patient has a CYP2D6 poor metabolizer genotype; and<br /><br />if the patient has a CYP2D6 poor metabolizer genotype, then internally administering iloperidone to the patient in an amount of 12 mg/day or less, and<br /><br />if the patient does not have a CYP2D6 poor metabolizer genotype, then internally administering iloperidone to the patient in an amount that is greater than 12 mg/day, up to 24 mg/day,<br /><br />wherein a risk of QTc prolongation for a patient having a CYP2D6 poor metabolizer genotype is lower following the internal administration of 12 mg/day or less than it would be if the iloperidone were administered in an amount of greater than 12 mg/day, up to 24 mg/day.&nbsp;QTc prolongation refers to prolongation of the interval between the Q and T components of the patient&rsquo;s electrocardiogram, and QTc indicates that the QT value has been corrected for the patient&rsquo;s heart rate.</div><div><br />The CAFC found that the <i>Vanda</i> claim is patent-eligible subject matter (i.e., step one of a patentability analysis under 35 U.S.C. &sect;101) and that it was therefore not necessary to proceed with further analysis to determine if the claimed subject matter includes additional elements to transform the nature of the claim from being directed to a patent-ineligible law of nature into a patent-eligible method claim. &nbsp;&nbsp;The CAFC distinguished the claims in the &lsquo;610 patent from those in <i>Mayo</i>.&nbsp;The CAFC indicated that unlike the present case, in <i>Mayo</i> &ldquo;the claim as a whole was not directed to the application of a drug to treat a particular disease.&rdquo; In contrast, &ldquo;the &lsquo;610 patent claims are directed to a method of using iloperidone to treat schizophrenia.&rdquo;&nbsp;&ldquo;[T]he &lsquo;610 patent claims are &ldquo;a new way of using an existing drug&rdquo; that is safer for patients because it reduces the risk of QTc prolongation.&rdquo;&nbsp;Furthermore, to the extent that preemption is a concern, &ldquo;unlike the claim in <i>Mayo</i>, ...the &lsquo;610 patent claims do not &ldquo;tie up the doctor&rsquo;s subsequent treatment decision.&rdquo;&nbsp;In contrast to the treatment steps in the &lsquo;610 patent claims, &ldquo;the claim in <i>Mayo</i> stated that the metabolite level in blood simply &ldquo;indicates&rdquo; a need to increase or decrease dosage, without prescribing a specific dosage regimen or other added steps to take as a result of that indication.&rdquo;&nbsp;In terms of patent eligibility, the CAFC concluded:<br />&nbsp;</div><div style="margin-left: 40px;">At bottom, the claims here are directed to a specific method of treatment for specific patients using a specific compound at specific doses to achieve a specific outcome. They are different from <i>Mayo</i>. They recite more than the natural relationship between CYP2D6 metabolizer genotype and the risk of QTc prolongation. Instead, they recite a method of treating patients based on this relationship that makes iloperidone safer by lowering the risk of QTc prolongation. Accordingly, the claims are patent eligible.</div><div><br />The <i>Vanda</i> decision confirms the validity of the strategy for U.S. patent protection of pursuing claims directed to a method of treatment based on the results of a specific diagnostic test recited in the claims.&nbsp;However, since corresponding patent-eligibility subject matter issues have not been raised in other important jurisdictions, e.g. Europe, it would be prudent to include in patent applications intended for international filings claims directed to diagnostic methods or uses comparable to those for which patent protection could have been obtained in the U.S. prior to the <i>Mayo</i> decision.<br /><br />* Alan D. Miller, Ph.D. is a Senior Counsel and Brian Amos, Ph.D. is an Associate at Amster Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP.&nbsp; &nbsp;They may be reached at <a href="mailto:amiller@arelaw.com">amiller@arelaw.com</a> and <a href="mailto:bamos@arelaw.com">bamos@arelaw.com</a>.&nbsp;</div> Fri, 20 Apr 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert042018/