Amster Rothstein & Ebenstein, LLP - Intellectual Property Law

ARE Patent Law Alert:
Federal Circuit Clarifies Recapture Rule For Analysis Of Reissue Claims

Fri, 11 May 2012 00:00:00 -0500

(May 11, 2012). Earlier this week, the Federal Circuit in In re Youman, No. 2011-1136, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9346 (Fed. Cir. May 8, 2012) clarified the meets and bounds of the recapture rule for broadening reissue patents.

Generally, the reissue statute allows a patentee to broaden claims in its original patent if the patentee can show “error without any deceptive intention.” 35 U.S.C. § 251. However, the recapture rule bars reissue applications that broaden claims in order to recapture subject matter surrendered during the original prosecution.

In Youman, the Federal Circuit applied a three-step recapture rule analysis in determining whether an applicant’s reissue claims violate the recapture rule. Id. at *15.

First, the reissue claims are compared to the issued patent claims to determine which, if any, aspects of the reissue claims are broader than the issued patent claims.

Next, the broader aspects of the issued patent claims are compared to surrendered subject matter during the original prosecution.

Finally, if the reissue claims are broader relative to the patented claims in a manner related to the surrendered subject matter, the broader aspects are analyzed to determine whether the surrendered subject matter has crept into the reissue claim.

Significantly, in Youman, the Federal Circuit held that the Board improperly applied the recapture rule by comparing the reissue claims to the patented claims, rather than to the original claims stating that “[i]f the patentee modifies the added limitation such that it is broader than the patented claim yet still materially narrows relative to the original claim, the recapture rule does not bar reissue.” In re Youman, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9346, at *26. Thus, Youman holds that the recapture rule permits reissue claims of intermediate scope, namely, those between the scope of the original claim in the application and the issued claim.

We will continue to monitor and report on post-issuance patent proceedings cases, and encourage you to review the publications and events page of our firm website (www.arelaw.com) for more information. Please feel free to contact one of our firm’s attorneys to learn more.

*Charles Macedo and Michael J. Kasdan are partners and Addie A. Bendory is an associate at Amster, Rothstein & Ebenstein LLP. Their practice specializes in intellectual property issues. They may be reached at cmacedo@arelaw.com, mkasdan@arelaw.com and abendory@arelaw.com.

Mr. Macedo is also the author of The Corporate Insider’s Guide to U.S. Patent Practice, published by Oxford University Press in 2009.

ARE Patent Law Alert:
Federal Circuit Finds Patents Unenforceable Under Therasense Standard

Fri, 11 May 2012 00:00:00 -0500

(May 11, 2012) On April 9, 2012, the Federal Circuit affirmed the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware’s holding that Aventis Pharma’s patent claims were unenforceable on inequitable conduct grounds under the higher standard for unenforceability set forth in Therasense. See Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 7095, at *20 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 9, 2012) (“Aventis II”). Notably, the district court had found inequitable conduct under standards that were in effect prior to the Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in Therasense.

In affirming the district court’s findings that the inventor of the patents at issue engaged in inequitable conduct by failing to disclose two prior art references, the Federal Circuit relied on its holding in Therasense which had rejected a “sliding scale” approach to proving inequitable conduct, finding instead that the two elements of the inequitable conduct defense - materiality and intent - are “separate requirements” Under Therasense,“but-for materiality is the standard for evaluating the materiality prong of the analysis unless there is affirmative egregious misconduct.” Aventis II, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 7095, at *20. Therasense further requires clear and convincing proof that “the applicant knew of the reference, knew that it was material, and made a deliberate decision to withhold it.” Moreover, a finding of specific intent to deceive must be the single most reasonable inference able to be drawn from the evidence.” Id. The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court’s finding of intent and materiality were sufficient to find inequitable conduct under the heightened Therasense standards. Id. at *19.

As to materiality, the Federal Circuit agreed that the but-for materiality standard was met because, inter alia, the district court had found these references sufficient to render the asserted claims of the patents-in-suit obvious and the references were inconsistent with the positions that patentee took in arguing for the patentability of the claims. Id. at *21.

As to the intent prong, the district court had found intent to deceive based on the evidence and its assessment of the inventor’s testimony, and determined that the inventor knew that the reference was relevant to the patentability of his alleged invention, but chose not to disclose it. Although the inventor attempted to raise certain excuse-arguments, the district court found and Federal Circuit agreed that such excuses were not credible and were inconsistent with other aspects of his testimony. For example, the inventor argued that he did not disclose one of the references, because tests based on using the solution disclosed therein had failed. However, this was contradicted by other evidence and testimony which highlighted the importance of the solution to the patented invention. Deferring to the district court’s credibility determinations in light of the evidence, the Federal Circuit did not disturb the district court’s finding of specific intent to deceive the PTO. Id. at *26.

Aventis II is significant in that it marks the first the time that the Federal Circuit has upheld a finding of inequitable conduct since the Therasense decision and demonstrates that failure to cite prior art can still raise issues of inequitable conduct in the face of the higher standard articulated in Therasense.

We will continue to monitor and report on inequitable conduct cases, and encourage you to review the publications and events page of our firm website (www.arelaw.com) for more information. Please feel free to contact one of our firm’s attorneys to learn more.

*Charles Macedo is a partner and Addie A. Bendory is an associate at Amster, Rothstein & Ebenstein LLP. Their practice specializes in intellectual property issues. They may be reached at cmacedo@arelaw.com and abendory@arelaw.com.

Mr. Macedo is also the author of The Corporate Insider’s Guide to U.S. Patent Practice, published by Oxford University Press in 2009.

ARE Patent Law Alert:
Supreme Court Holds New Evidence Can Be Presented In A Civil Action Brought In District Courts Against The PTO

Wed, 09 May 2012 00:00:00 -0500

On April 18, 2012, in a unanimous decision authored by Justice Thomas, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a patent applicant is entitled to present new evidence in a civil action brought under 35 U.S.C. § 145 against the Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), and that any factual disputes created by the newly admitted evidence must be reviewed de novo rather than under the substantial evidence standard. See Kappos v. Hyatt, 131 S. Ct. 3064, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 3107 (2012) (“Hyatt IV”).

Prior Proceedings

If a patent examiner denies claims in a submitted application, the applicant may file for an administrative appeal with the PTO’s Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“Board”). If the Board denies the application, the applicant may either (1) appeal the decision to the Federal Circuit pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 141 or (2) file a civil action against the Director of the PTO in the District Court for the District of Columbia pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 145.

In Hyatt v. Dudas, Hyatt filed an application for an “improved memory architecture having a multiple buffer output arrangement, which relates to a computerized display system for processing images.” Hyatt v. Dudas, No. 03-0901, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45319, at *7 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2005) (“Hyatt I”). After several amendments, Hyatt presented 117 claims for examination. Id. The Examiner rejected all 117 claims on various grounds. On appeal to the Board, the Board affirmed the rejection of 79 claims for lack of written description and/or lack of enablement and overturned the other rejections. Id. Hyatt appealed the Board’s rejection of the 79 claims to the District Court. In connection with the appeal, he submitted a new written declaration that identified portions of the patent specification supporting the claims that the Board had rejected. The district court refused to consider the declaration and held that applicants are “precluded from presenting new issues, or at least in the absence of some reason of justice put forward for failure to present the issue to the Patent Office.” Id. at *15. The District Court then granted summary judgment to the Director, considering only the PTO’s administrative record under a substantial evidence standard.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s holding. Hyatt v. Doll, 576 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Hyatt II”). The court primarily upheld the district court’s decision that “the district court did not commit any legal error or abuse its discretion in excluding Hyatt’s declaration because of Hyatt’s failure to present [the] evidence earlier.” Id. at 1277. Specifically, the Federal Circuit found that until the appeal “Hyatt [had] willfully refused to respond to the examiner’s written description rejections by pointing out where in the specification support for his claims could be found . . . . Id. Furthermore, the court held that “[t]his failure of Hyatt, who at the time had been a patent agent for over twenty years, to perform a simple task that it was his burden to perform is inexcusable in the circumstances of this case.” Id.

Subsequently, the Federal Circuit granted rehearing en banc and vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Hyatt v. Kappos, 625 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Hyatt III”). In Hyatt III, the en banc court held “that Congress intended that applicants would be free to introduce new evidence in § 145 proceedings subject only to the rules applicable to all civil actions, the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” even if the applicant had no justification for failing to present the evidence to the PTO. Hyatt III, 625 F.3d at 1331. Moreover, the district court must review such findings de novo. Id. at 1336.

The Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed Hyatt III. Hyatt IV, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 3107, at *26. In particular, the Supreme Court explained that the text of § 145 grants a disappointed patent applicant a remedy by civil action against the Director and that § 145 neither imposes unique evidentiary limits not establishes a heighted standard of review for factual findings by the PTO. Id. at *12.

The Supreme Court further rejected the Director’s contention that principles of administrative law require a deferential standard of review in a § 145 proceeding. Id. at *15. Nonetheless, in an effort to address the PTO’s concern, the Court confirmed that the district court “may, in its discretion, consider the proceedings before and findings of the Patent Office in deciding what weight to afford an applicant’s newly-admitted evidence.” Id. at *25. In this way the district court can accommodate its own need to consider the new evidence presented with its duty to “accord respect to decisions of the PTO.” Id. In coming to this accommodation, Hyatt IV expressly rejected the possibility that an applicant could be motivated to “withhold evidence from the PTO intentionally with the goal of presenting that evidence for the first time to a nonexpert judge.” Id. This scenario would be unlikely, according to the Court, because “[a]n applicant who pursues such a strategy would be intentionally undermining his claims before the PTO on the speculative chance that he will gain some advantage in the §145 proceeding by presenting new evidence to a district court judge.“ Id.

We will continue to monitor and report on patent evidentiary cases, and encourage you to review the publications and events page of our firm website (www.arelaw.com) for more information. Please feel free to contact one of our firm’s attorneys to learn more.

ARE Copyright Law Alert:
Second Circuit Clarifies Digital Millenium Copyright Act’s Safe Harbor Provisions In Viacom International, Inc. v. Youtube, Inc. Decision

Wed, 18 Apr 2012 00:00:00 -0500

(April 18, 2012) On April 5, 2012, a unanimous panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit clarified both (i) the proper interpretation of 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)’s safe harbor language regarding an online service provider’s “right and ability to control” infringing activity, and (ii) whether certain software functions that are made available by online service providers fall within § 512(c)’s safe harbor for infringement that occurs “by reason of” storage at the direction of the user. See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 10-3270-cv, 10-3342-cv, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 6909 (2d Cir. Apr. 5, 2012) (“YouTube II”). The Second Circuit then upheld those portions of the Southern District’s judgment that were supported by the facts in the record, but vacated and remanded for further proceedings those portions of the judgment that were not. YouTube II, like other recent appellate decisions, thus reaffirms that the successful resolution of online copyright issues depends on a proper development of case-specific facts and circumstances rather than on a broad rhetorical invocation of the DMCA’s safe harbors. See Anthony F. Lo Cicero and Holly Pekowsky, ARE Trademark Law Alert: Fourth Circuit Revives Rosetta Stone Case Against Google’s Keyword Searching, April 13, 2012.

In the decision under review, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of defendants YouTube and Google against charges of direct and secondary copyright infringement by plaintiffs Viacom International, Inc., Paramount Pictures Corp., and others. See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Stanton, J.) (“YouTube I”). The district court found that defendants were entitled to safe harbor protection of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act primarily because they had insufficient notice of the particular infringements at issue. More specifically, in construing the DMCA’s safe harbor, the court concluded that the actual knowledge that would disqualify an online service provider under § 512(c)(1)(A) was “knowledge of specific and identifiable infringements”; mere knowledge of the “prevalence of such activity in general” would not do. Id. at 523. Further, item-specific knowledge of a particular infringement was required for a service provider to have the “right and ability to control” infringing activity under § 512(c)(1)(B). Id. at 527. Finally, the court found that YouTube’s replication, transmittal, and display of videos in most cases constituted activity “by reason of the storage at the direction of a user” under § 512(c)(1)(C). Id. at 526-27.

Significantly, the Second Circuit affirmed the Southern District’s conclusion that the standard for actual knowledge of infringements was “knowledge of specific and identifiable infringements.” YouTube II, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 6909, at *25. However, the Second Circuit believed that plaintiffs may have raised material issues of fact regarding YouTube’s knowledge of specific instances of infringement that precluded a grant of summary judgment by the district court. Plaintiff’s evidence of YouTube’s knowledge included: surveys by company employees including estimates of the percentage of copyrighted material on the YouTube website; similar estimates provided by third-party financial advisors to YouTube’s owner Google; and internal e-mails involving YouTube officers referring to particular clips that might contain infringing material. The Second Circuit therefore vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants, and remanded the case to allow for a more finely-grained determination of whether the evidence demonstrated that YouTube had knowledge of specific instances of infringement.

The Second Circuit rejected the Southern District’s contention that item-specific knowledge of any infringement was required for a service provider to have the “right and ability to control” infringing activity under § 512(c)(1)(B). However, it also rejected the interpretation advanced by the plaintiffs in the underlying action that § 512(c)(1)(B) merely codifies the common law doctrine of vicarious copyright liability. Adopting that doctrine, in which the ability to block infringers’ access is prima facie evidence of the right and ability to supervise, the Second Circuit noted, would render the statute, which presumes such an ability in § 512(c)(1)(C), internally inconsistent. The Second Circuit thus opined that the right and ability to control infringing activity “requires something more that the ability to remove or block access to materials posted on a service provider’s website.” Id. at *47 (quoting Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, No. 07-9931, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93351, at *37 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011)). What that something more is was not specified, but will be something for the district court to determine on remand.

Finally, the Second Circuit in YouTube II held that YouTube’s conversion (transcoding) of videos into a standard display format, playback of videos on “watch” pages, and “related videos” functions constitute activity “by reason of the storage at the direction of a user” under § 512(c)(1)(C). In other words, § 512(c) “is clearly meant to cover more than mere electronic storage lockers.” Id. at *51 (quoting UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2008). However, the court remanded for further consideration whether third-party syndication of videos uploaded to YouTube was also covered by § 512(c)(1)(C). Again, any decision on remand should prove instructive.

The YouTube II decision is analogous to recent appellate cases like Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., No. 10-2007, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 7082 (4th Cir. Apr. 9, 2012), Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010), and Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009), which demonstrate courts are carefully considering the particular facts on a case-by-case basis with respect to online trademark infringement claims.

*Anthony F. Lo Cicero is a Partner and David P. Goldberg is a law clerk at Amster, Rothstein & Ebenstein LLP. Their practice specializes in intellectual property issues including litigating patent, trademark and other intellectual property disputes. They may be reached at alocicero@arelaw.com and dgoldberg@arelaw.com.

ARE Trademark Law Alert:
Fourth Circuit Revives Rosetta Stone Case Against Google’s Keyword Searching

Fri, 13 Apr 2012 00:00:00 -0500

(April 12, 2012) On April 9, 2012, a unanimous panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit restored Rosetta Stone's trademark infringement and dilution lawsuit against
Google. See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., No. 10-2007, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 7082 (4th
Cir. Apr. 9, 2012) (“Rosetta II”). The court determined that there were genuine issues of
material fact requiring trial as to whether Google's sale of keywords constituted trademark
infringement or trademark dilution, and whether Google was vicariously or contributorily liable
for the sale of counterfeit Rosetta Stone products being sold by the keyword advertisers.

In the decision under review, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Google,
finding that no reasonable trier of fact could find that Google’s practice of auctioning trademarks
as keywords or triggers to third party advertisers would create a likelihood of confusion as to the
source of origin, or otherwise violate plaintiff’s rights. Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 730 F.
Supp. 2d 531 (E.D. Va. 2010) (“Rosetta I”).

In reversing the district court, the Rosetta II court held that there were genuine issues of material
fact on the issue of direct infringement as to whether Google intended to cause confusion, as to
whether confusion had actually resulted, and as to the sophistication of consumers.

Specifically, on the issue of intent, there was evidence that Google was aware that its policy of
allowing trademarks to be used in the text of ads would create some confusion, but also that it
would bring in more revenue. On the issue of actual confusion, Rosetta II held, among other
things, that the district court should not have discounted testimony from individuals who
purchased counterfeit Rosetta Stone products from a Google advertiser. Although the customers
knew they were not purchasing directly from Rosetta Stone, they thought the Google advertisers
were affiliated with Rosetta Stone, and this type of confusion is also actionable. Lastly, with
respect to consumer sophistication, the court in Rosetta II held that even though the Rosetta
Stone products are relatively expensive (a few hundred dollars), that alone is not sufficient to
conclude that consumers are sophisticated, particularly since there was an internal Google study
which showed that even well-educated, seasoned internet consumers are sometimes confused by
sponsored links.

The court also rejected the "functionality" defense, which prohibits the acquisition of trademark
rights in a product or its packaging. Google had claimed that its use of the Rosetta Stone mark in
keyword advertising was functional, but the Rosetta II court focused instead on Rosetta Stone’s
use of its own mark, which was clearly not functional.

Turning to Rosetta Stone's claim of contributory infringement, the court in Rosetta II found that
there was sufficient evidence in the record to defeat summary judgment as to Google’s purported allowance of known infringers and counterfeiters to bid on the Rosetta Stone marks. Rosetta II
also concluded that there were genuine issues of fact requiring trial on Rosetta Stone's claim that
Google’s sale of keyword advertising diluted the Rosetta Stone mark.

There has been a trend recently in appellate internet cases like Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.,
No. 10-3270-cv, 10-3342-cv, 2012U.S. App. LEXIS 6909 (2d Cir. Apr. 5, 2012), and Rescuecom
Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009), to avoid hard and fast rules and consider the
particular facts on a case-by-case basis with respect to assertions of trademark infringement
(direct or indirect) or dilution. Consistent with this trend, Rosetta II determined that the
resolution of such trademark issues depends on case-specific facts and circumstances, rather than
on general policies or procedures put in place by the defendant or on broad propositions of law.

Please monitor our website for continued developments on this issue.

* Anthony F. Lo Cicero is a partner and Holly Pekowsky is senior counsel at Amster, Rothstein
& Ebenstein LLP. Their practice specializes in intellectual property issues. They may be reached
at alocicero@arelaw.com and hpekowsky@arelaw.com.

ARE Litigation Alert:
U.S. Supreme Court Finds Prometheus Method of Diagnosing and/or Treating Unpatentable Law of Nature

Tue, 20 Mar 2012 00:00:00 -0500

U.S. Supreme Court Finds Prometheus Method of Diagnosing and/or Treating Unpatentable Law of Nature

By Charles R. Macedo, Michael J. Kasdan and David Boag*

(March 20, 2012) On March 20, 2012, in a unanimous decision authored by Justice Breyer, the U.S. Supreme Court found patent claims directed to diagnosing and/or treating a disease to be an unpatentable law of nature under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., No. 10-1150, Slip Op. (U.S. Mar. 20, 2012).

In Mayo, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the principles set forth in its prior decisions in Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U. S. ___ (2010); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); and Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), remain in full force and affect. The Court rejected the notion of the “machine or transformation” test as a surrogate for determining whether a claim preempted an abstract idea, law of nature or natural phenomena and instead focused on whether a claim merely seeks to preempt a law of nature (which is not patent eligible) or claims an particular application of a law of nature (which is patent eligible). In performing this determination, the Court confirmed that merely adding insignificant “post-solution” or “pre-solution” activities is not sufficient to turn a claim that preempts a law of nature into a practical application of a law of nature, and thus become patent eligible. Here, the Court found that the additional steps of the claim beyond the law of nature itself added “nothing specific to the laws of nature other than what is well-understood, routine, conventional activity, previously engaged by those in the field.” Thus, the Court concluded that the claims did not claim a genuine application of a law of nature.

The Court also reconfirmed that merely limiting a claim to a particular field of use - here, the medical field - is not sufficient to turn a claim that preempts a law of nature into a practical application of a law of nature, and thus become patent eligible.

The Court also rejected efforts to screen claims directed to “laws of nature” by using other portions of the Patent Act, including novelty, obviousness and definiteness inquiries, or crafting special judicial rules for particular types of inventions.

Since the Supreme Court decided Bilski in 2010, there have been a series of divergent opinions issuing from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit on patent-eligibility. It is not clear whether Mayo will provide any further clarity on the issue of patent eligible subject matter.

Please continue to monitor our website for further developments on patent-eligible subject matter.

* Charles R. Macedo and Michael Kasdan are partners and David Boag is a senior counsel at Amster, Rothstein & Ebenstein LLP. Their practice specializes in intellectual property issues, including litigating patent, trademark and other intellectual property disputes. They may be reached at cmacedo@arelaw.com, mkasdan@arelaw.com and dboag@arelaw.com.

Mr. Macedo is also the author of The Corporate Insider’s Guide to U.S. Patent Practice, published by Oxford University Press in 2009 and, along with Anthony F. LoCicero, was counsel on the amicus submission submitted by the New York Intellectual Property Law Association to the Supreme Court in Mayo v. Prometheus.

Federal circuit grants mandamus on Delaware transfer motion

Wed, 22 Feb 2012 00:00:00 -0600

In re Link_A_Media Devices Corp., 662 F.3d 1221, US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 2 December 2011 (per curiam)

Abstract

The US Federal Circuit has granted a petition for a writ of mandamus directing the US District Court of Delaware to transfer a case to the Northern District of California. The district court was found to have committed a clear error by putting too much emphasis on the fact that the defendant was incorporated in Delaware, at the expense of other relevant considerations.

Legal Context

Over the past few years, venue selection in US patent infringement actions has become a major issue. The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has increasingly issued writs of mandamus to district courts for refusing to transfer actions where the parties had insufficient contact with the forum. Until recently, the writs primarily involved actions brought in the Eastern District of Texas. In In re Link_A_Media Devices Corp., the Federal Circuit issued a writ of mandamus directing transfer of a patent infringement action from the US District Court for the District of Delaware to the US District Court for the Northern District of California. Link_A_Media balances the weight of the corporate citizenship of the parties against other convenience factors.

Facts

Marvell International Ltd brought a patent infringement action against Link_A_Media Devices Corp. (‘LAMD’) in the US District Court for the District of Delaware. Marvell was incorporated under the laws of Bermuda, where it had a regular, established place of business. It was a holding company for a related company that was headquartered in the Northern District of California, which employed the inventors of the patents in suit and is presumed to house the relevant documents.

LAMD is a Delaware corporation that also has offices in California. Nearly all of LAMD's 130 employees work at its California headquarters, and none of its employees work in Delaware. After the district court denied LAMD's motion to transfer, LAMD sought a writ of mandamus from the Federal Circuit directing the Delaware District Court to transfer the case.

Analysis

The Federal Circuit, per curiam, granted the extraordinary remedy of the petition for writ of mandamus and ordered the Delaware District Court to transfer the action to the California District Court.

Applying the law of the Third Circuit, the forum circuit where the District of Delaware is located, the Federal Circuit looked to the various private and public interest factors to be considered in a motion to transfer under 28 USC §1404 as set out in Jumara v State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1995). The Federal Circuit found that the district court failed to balance those factors fairly and instead elevated two considerations to overriding importance: ‘With respect to private interests, the district court's fundamental error was making Marvell's choice of forum and the fact of LAMD's incorporation in Delaware effectively dispositive of the transfer inquiry.'

First, Link_A_Media found that while the Third Circuit places significance on a plaintiff's choice of forum, the district court placed far too much weight on the plaintiff's choice of forum. This is so because when a plaintiff brings its charges in a venue that is not its home forum, that choice of forum is entitled to less deference.

Secondly, Link_A_Media found the district court's heavy reliance on the fact that LAMD was incorporated in Delaware was similarly inappropriate. The Federal Circuit reasoned: ‘Neither [28 USC] § 1404 nor Jumara list a party's state of incorporation as a factor for a venue inquiry. It is certainly not a dispositive fact in the venue transfer analysis, as the district court in this case seemed to believe.’

Thirdly, Link_A_Media found the district court erred when it also refused to consider two of the private interest factors in a Third Circuit venue inquiry: the convenience of the witnesses and the location of the books and records. The Federal Circuit criticized the district court's conclusion that these factors are ‘outdated, irrelevant, and should be given little weight, if any, except for those rare instances where truly regional defendants are litigating’. The Federal Circuit explained that while advances in technology may alter the weight given to these factors, it is improper to ignore them entirely.

Fourthly, Link_A_Media found that the district court also erred when it found that consideration of the public interest factors did not favour either forum. The Federal Circuit expressly criticized the district court for its over-reliance on the state of incorporation of the defendant as part of the public interest factors: ‘The defendant's state of incorporation … should not be dispositive of the public interest analysis’ particularly where ‘[a]side from LAMD's incorporation in Delaware, that forum has no ties to the dispute or to either party’.

Finally, Link_A_Media rejected Marvell's argument that the public interest favoured the case remaining in Delaware because that district's judges were highly experienced in patent infringement litigation as ‘confusing the public interest factor relating to a trial court's familiarity with applicable state law’—which does not apply to a patent case that ‘arise[s] under the federal patent laws, for which there is uniformity nationwide’.

Thus the Federal Circuit granted the petition for writ of mandamus and directed the district court: to vacate its order denying petitioner's motion to transfer venue and to direct transfer to the US District Court for the Northern District of California.

Practical significance

Link_A_Media is likely to cause more patent infringement actions to be transferred from the Delaware Court when the parties' only connection to Delaware is that a defendant is incorporated there. While the Federal Circuit did not reject the relevance of the corporate residence of a party to an action, it did require greater contact to a forum jurisdiction than merely place of incorporation. It will be interesting to see if the Third Circuit will address this issue and offer the same conclusion.

*Charles R. Macedo is a partner at Amster, Rothstein & Ebenstein LLP. His practice specializes in intellectual property issues including litigating patent, trademark and other intellectual property disputes. The author may be reached at cmacedo@arelaw.com.

Mr. Macedo is also the author of The Corporate Insider’s Guide to U.S. Patent Practice, published by Oxford University Press in 2009.

$24 million judgment of wilful infringement affirmed by Federal Circuit

Mon, 20 Feb 2012 00:00:00 -0600

Powell v Home Depot USA, Inc., No 2010-1409, -1416, US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 2011 US App. LEXIS 22838, 14 November 2011

Abstract

The US Federal Circuit affirms a jury verdict that a defendant wilfully infringed a patent on a saw guard, discussing claim construction, damages, enhanced damages, and inequitable conduct.

Legal Context

In recent years, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has gained the reputation for reversing most decisions of district courts in patent infringement matters. Many large jury verdicts have been overturned based on improper claim construction, improper theory of damages, or other legal errors. In Powell v Home Depot USA, Inc., the Federal Circuit conducted an in-depth analysis of virtually all the aspects of a patent case to uphold the judgment that the patent-in-suit was wilfully infringed and not unenforceable. Powell is a reminder that patent protection in the USA can still be valuable, and that potential infringers should be wary of ignoring prospective business partners' patent protection.

Facts

In 2002 and 2003 Home Depot, one of the largest, most profitable home improvement retailers in the USA, had a problem: its employees were suffering injuries including lacerations and finger amputations caused while operating in-store radial arm saws to cut timber for customers. Home Depot's management issued a directive that the radial saws either be fixed, to prevent injuries, or be removed from all stores.

Mr Powell, Home Depot's point-of-contact for the installation and repair of radial arm saws, set out to find a solution to this problem. In July 2004, he presented a solution to Home Depot, resulting in the installation of eight production units for testing in Home Depot stores. In August 2004, Mr Powell filed a patent application.

Home Depot separately contracted with a different entity, Industriaplex, to build and install saw guards for its radial arm saws at a lower price than that quoted by Mr Powell. Home Depot invited Industriaplex to view and build nearly identical copies of Mr Powell's saw guards for a reduced price. Industriaplex agreed. Mr Powell then sued Home Depot for infringement of his patent.

After a 14-day jury trial, the jury reached a unanimous verdict that Home Depot wilfully and literally infringed Mr Powell's patent, awarding him $15 million. The district court awarded an additional $3 million in enhanced damages, and $2.8 million in attorneys' fees. A final judgment in the amount of $23,950,889.13, including prejudgment interest, was entered.

Analysis

In Powell, the Federal Circuit was asked to review virtually every aspect of the issues raised at trial and in post-trial proceedings that led to the almost $24 million judgment. With respect to each issue, from claim construction, to infringement, to damages, to enhanced damages, to inequitable conduct, the Federal Circuit found that the district court committed no error and affirmed in total the judgment entered.

Claim construction and infringement
Home Depot challenged the district court's construction and infringement analysis of two claim terms used in Mr Powell's claims: ‘dust collection structure’ and ‘table top’.

Dust collection structure

With respect to ‘dust collection structure’, Home Depot argued that the term should be construed as a means-plus-function term under 35 USC §112, ¶ 6. In an earlier claim construction, the district court agreed with Home Depot, but changed its construction at the time of trial.

The Federal Circuit, in reviewing the district court's construction, found that the claim term ‘dust collection structure’ was not subject to construction as a means-plus-function element under 35 USC §112, ¶ 6. In reaching this conclusion, the Federal Circuit relied upon the following:

The presumption that the failure to use the term ‘means’ reflected the intent of the inventor not to invoke 35 USC §112, ¶ 6.
When viewed ‘in the context of the entire limitation’, ‘the claim language at issue recites sufficiently definite structure’.
The written descriptions' disclosure of the ‘dust collection structure’ depicts specific component parts and details of the functions of each part.
The prior art discussed in the background of the invention disclosed various types of prior art dust collection structures, evidencing that the term has a reasonably well-understood meaning to those skilled in the art.

In sum, the claim language, the disclosure in the written description, and the meaning to persons of ordinary skill indicated that Home Depot failed to rebut the presumption that the claimed ‘dust collection structure’ was not a means-plus-function limitation.

In addition to challenging the ‘claim construction’ for this term, Home Depot argued on appeal that the jury verdict was in error and that the district court erred in not granting judgment as a matter of law since ‘the terms “cutting box” and “dust collection structure” are distinct terms and can only be infringed by a device that has separate structures corresponding to the distinct claim elements’.

The Federal Circuit disagreed, distinguishing a prior case in which the claim language and specification required two claim limitations to be separate structures from Mr Powell's claims and specification, which did not suggest that the claim terms required separate structures.

Table top

Home Depot challenged the district court's construction of ‘table top’ in the claims because it failed to impose an additional requirement that the ‘table top’ function as a horizontal work surface to support timber while being cut. The Federal Circuit disagreed. In support, the Federal Circuit turned to other claim limitations that already addressed the ‘work surface support’, concluding that it was unnecessary to import such a function into the ‘table top’ limitation. The Federal Circuit also looked to the specification, which likewise distinguished between the table top and the work surface to support its construction.

Inequitable conduct
Home Depot argued that Mr Powell committed inequitable conduct by failing to inform the Patent Office that the basis for his petition to make special was no longer accurate at the time it was granted. In view of Therasense, Inc. v Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc), the Federal Circuit found that Home Depot did not meet its burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence inequitable conduct:

Where, as here, the patent applicant fails to update the record to inform the PTO that the circumstances which support a Petition to Make Special no longer exist—that conduct does not constitute inequitable conduct. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290. That is so because Mr. Powell's conduct obviously fails the but-for materiality standard and is not the type of unequivocal act, ‘such as the filing of an unmistakably false affidavit,’ that would rise to the level of ‘affirmative egregious misconduct.’ Id. at 1292–93.

Wilful infringement
Home Depot was found by the jury to have wilfully infringed Mr Powell's patent, and the district court denied Home Depot's motion for judgment as a matter of law. On appeal, Home Depot argued that it did not wilfully infringe because its actions did not satisfy the objective prong of the wilful infringement inquiry: the district court's denial of Mr Powell's request for a preliminary injunction and the closeness of the inequitable conduct case indicate that it did not act despite an objectively high likelihood of infringement. The Federal Circuit rejected both arguments based on the legal errors made in both sets of preliminary analyses.

The Federal Circuit clarified the role of the court and jury in a wilful infringement analysis. When the question raised is an issue of law, the determination of whether an infringer was objectively reasonable in reliance upon such a defence is a question for the court. When the question raised is an issue of fact, the fact-finder determines the objective reasonableness of the infringer. However, the Federal Circuit confirmed in a footnote that ‘[t]he objective and subjective willfulness questions should be sent to the jury only when the patentee proves by clear and convincing evidence that the objective prong of Seagate is met as to the legal issues that have been decided by the court’.

Damages
The Federal Circuit also affirmed a relatively high reasonable royalty rate for Mr Powell. Significantly, in supporting the royalty rate used by the jury, the Federal Circuit held that ‘[w]hile either the infringer's or the patentee's profit expectation may be considered in the overall reasonable royalty analysis, Georgia-Pacific Corp. v US Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), neither is an absolute limit to the amount of the reasonable royalty that may be awarded upon a reasoned hypothetical negotiation analysis under the Georgia-Pacific factors’.

Practical significance

Powell is a reminder that patents in the USA can still be a valuable protection in business transactions when an inventor is asked to develop a solution to a problem that is then implemented by another. In affirming the jury verdict and resulting judgment, the Federal Circuit illustrated several important aspects of recent developments of patent law. First, since Therasense, it has become substantially more difficult for an infringer to prove an inequitable conduct case. Secondly, the Federal Circuit has established a procedure for determining wilful infringement and enhanced damages which is complex, but nonetheless takes into consideration the equities of the situation. Finally, although we have seen a recent trend that appears to curtail damages liability, Powell illustrates that a rationally related damages theory can result in a seemingly high royalty rate.

ARE Patent Law Alert:
The Supreme Court Denies Cert in favor of First Quality

Mon, 23 Jan 2012 00:00:00 -0600

(January 23, 2011) On January 23, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed with First Quality Baby Products, LLC and First Quality Retail Services, LLC (“First Quality”) and denied a request for writ of certiorari by Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, Inc. and Kimberly-Clark Global Sales, LLC (“K-C”). K-C in its petition was seeking review by the Supreme Court of the June 1, 2011 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversing a preliminary injunction entered against First Quality with respect to three K-C patents.

On September 29, 2011, the Federal Circuit rejected K-C's petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc.

Partners Kenneth P. George, Ira E. Silfin, Michael V. Solomita, Charles R. Macedo and Senior Counsel, Brian A. Comack , of Amster, Rothstein & Ebenstein LLP represent First Quality before the Supreme Court along with D. Michael Underhill and Eric Mauer of Boise Schiller & Flexner LLP.

Click here to access the Brief in Opposition.

In the Press:
TTOs often walk a fine line when negotiating rights to improvements

Mon, 16 Jan 2012 00:00:00 -0600

Technology Transfer Tactics quotes Charles R. Macedo, Partner, at Amster, Rothstein & Ebentsein, LLP.

The issues involved are typically straightforward, and both sides generally have a good point to make in the quest for improvement rights, notes Charles R. Macedo, partner at Amster, Rothstein & Ebenstein LLP, New York, and author of The Corporate Insider’s Guide to U.S. Patent Practice (Oxford University Press). “Typically there is a choice to be made as to what technology is being licensed,” he confirms -- the existing IP only or the future improvement of that technology as well. “When a licensor is ‘in the business’ and is putting a licensee ‘into the business,’ often the licensor may want to get at least a license back, if not an outright assignment, from the licensee to any improvements made. The theory is that but for the license, the licensee would not be in the business and thus would not have made the improvement.”

On the other hand, from a licensee’s perspective, “having access to any improvements made by the licensor may or may not be important. The advantage of getting improvement rights up front is it avoids the need of paying for a second license.” The downside is that it may make the license more expensive, he adds. As in all negotiations, giving in one area often lets you take in another, and improvement rights can be used as leverage for concessions on price and other negotiating points.

“The driving factor on this type of arrangement may turn on what type of technology is being licensed, how mature it is, the likelihood of either party’s making improvements, and the costs of obtaining rights to improvements,” he notes. “The impact is not merely license fees, but also freedom to operate issues.”

Read the full article here.

Brief in Opposition "Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, Inc. and Kimberly-Clark Global Sales, LLC, Petitioners, v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC and First Quality Retail Sercvices, LLC, Respondents, (December 30, 2011)"

Tue, 03 Jan 2012 00:00:00 -0600

Click to download PDF: Brief in Opposition "Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, Inc. and Kimberly-Clark Global Sales, LLC, Petitioners, v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC and First Quality Retail Sercvices, LLC, Respondents, (December 30, 2011)"

ARE Patent Law Alert:
First Quality Files Brief In Opposition To Cert Petition With The U.S. Supreme Court

Fri, 30 Dec 2011 00:00:00 -0600

FIRST QUALITY FILES BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO CERT PETITION WITH THE U.S. SUPREME COURT

By Kenneth P. George, Ira E. Silfin, Michael V. Solomita, Charles R. Macedo and Brian A. Comack

(December 30, 2011) On December 30, 2011, First Quality Baby Products, LLC and First Quality Retail Services, LLC (“First Quality”) filed their Brief in Opposition to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari filed by Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, Inc. and Kimberly-Clark Global Sales, LLC (“K-C”). K-C in its petition was seeking review by the Supreme Court of the June 1, 2011 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversing a preliminary injunction entered against First Quality with respect to three K-C patents.

On September 29, 2011, the Federal Circuit rejected K-C's petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc.

Partners Kenneth P. George, Ira E. Silfin, Michael V. Solomita, Charles R. Macedo and Senior Counsel, Brian A. Comack , of Amster, Rothstein & Ebenstein LLP represent First Quality before the Supreme Court along with D. Michael Underhill and Eric Mauer of Boise Schiller & Flexner LLP.

Click here to access the Brief in Opposition.

In the Press:
K-C Diaper Patent Wiped Out In First Quality IP Suit

Mon, 05 Dec 2011 00:00:00 -0600

Law 360 reports on December 2, 2011:

Law360, New York (December 05, 2011, 1:22 PM ET) -- A Wisconsin federal judge on Saturday ruled against Kimberly-Clark Worldwide Inc. in its ongoing patent dispute against First Quality Baby Products LLC, finding that a K-C diaper manufacturing patent is a clone of a previously registered process.

First Quality attorney Kenneth P. George told Law360 on Monday that his client wasn't surprised by Judge Griesbach's ruling, as the judge "had previously expressed concern" as to the validity of the '451 patent.

"First Quality is pleased with the court’s ruling," George said.

First Quality is represented by Kenneth P. George, Ira E. Silfin, Michael V. Solomita, Brian A. Comack and Michael J. Kasdan of Amster Rothstein & Ebenstein LLP

In the Press:
'T-minus' Buffet enters the private placement biz

Mon, 05 Dec 2011 00:00:00 -0600

'T-minus' Buffet enters the private placement biz

Firm that bears no relationship to the Oracle of Omaha or Berkshire Hathaway filed offering with the SEC last month

Such outlandish confusion with a famous name is a no-no, according to one intellectual-property attorney.

“It's outrageous. General trade market law prohibits using someone else's name or brand where that can cause confusion,” said Anthony F. LoCicero, a partner with Amster Rothstein & Ebenstein LLP.

“Warren Buffett is the most famous financial person in America, but I honestly don't know how many T's he has in his name,” Mr. Lo Cicero said. “It's a violation of Mr. Buffett's rights in many ways, and it will likely cause confusion and was likely intended to cause confusion.”

In the Press:
Mayo Case Could Clarify Patentability, Expand On Bilski

Fri, 02 Dec 2011 00:00:00 -0600

Mayo Case Could Clarify Patentability, Expand On Bilski

Law360, New York (December 02, 2011, 2:57 PM ET) -- The U.S. Supreme Court is set to hear oral arguments on Wednesday in a closely watched case over the patentability of a blood test method that attorneys say could elaborate on last year's Bilski decision in establishing what makes an invention eligible for a patent.

The case raises the question of whether meeting the machine-or-transformation test by itself establishes that an invention covers patent-eligible subject matter, said Charles Macedo of Amster Rothstein & Ebenstein LLP.

Macedo is one of the authors of an amicus brief in the case on behalf of the New York Intellectual Property Law Association, which supports neither party but argues that "satisfying the machine-or-transformation test should create a safe harbor of patent-eligible subject matter."

"Consistent with the broad scope of Section 101, the type of transformation present in a process is immaterial to determining patent eligibility, because any transformation will carry a claimed invention across the Section 101 threshold," the brief states.

法改正「先願主義」移行、弁護士に聞く, 日経産業新聞 (Nikkei) - (ONLY AVAILABLE IN JAPANESE)

Mon, 07 Nov 2011 00:00:00 -0600

Click Here to download the article.

In the Press:
Technology Transfer turns to partner, Charles R. Macedo, for expertise on new patent report law

Wed, 26 Oct 2011 00:00:00 -0500

Technology Transfer turns to partner, Charles R. Macedo, for expertise on new patent report law:

“As each new provision of the Act becomes effective, there will be a rush of new applications and lawsuits filed before such enactment or immediately after such enactment,” notes Charles R. Macedo, a partner at Amster Rothstein & Ebenstein LLP.

Practice Note: Patent Infringement Claims and Defenses (Updated for America Invents Act)

Sat, 15 Oct 2011 00:00:00 -0500

A practice note discussing patent infringement claims and defenses in the US federal courts. It provides an overview of direct and indirect infringement claims, claim construction and key defenses under US patent law. It also includes a brief discussion of procedural considerations, remedies and alternative forums for patent dispute resolution.

Click here to download the article.

Implications of Post-Seagate Cases Finding Willful Infringement

Thu, 06 Oct 2011 00:00:00 -0500

Click Here to download the article.

In the Press:
Kimberly-Clark Loses Fed. Circ. Rehearing Bid In IP Row

Thu, 06 Oct 2011 00:00:00 -0500

Law 360 reports on September 29, 2011:

The Federal Circuit on Thursday denied Kimberly-Clark Worldwide Inc.’s petition for an en banc rehearing of its decision tossing a lower court’s preliminary injunction against First Quality Baby Products LLC in Kimberly-Clark’s patent infringement suit over diaper products.

Partner Kenneth P. George from Amster, Rothstein & Ebenstein LLP was lead counsel on the appeal. Partners Ira E. Silfin, Michael V. Solomita, Charles R. Macedo and Senior Counsel Brian Comack appeared with him on the briefs successfully arguing against rehearing en banc.

Kimberly-Clark Loses Fed. Circ. Rehearing Bid In IP Row By Django Gold http://www.law360.com/articles/274717/kimberly-clark-loses-fed-circ-rehearing-bid-in-ip-row

Click Here to download the article.

Amster Rothstein & Ebenstein, LLP - Intellectual Property Law

ARE Patent Law Alert: Federal Circuit Clarifies Recapture Rule For Analysis Of Reissue Claims

ARE Patent Law Alert: Federal Circuit Finds Patents Unenforceable Under Therasense Standard

ARE Patent Law Alert:Supreme Court Holds New Evidence Can Be Presented In A Civil Action Brought In District Courts Against The PTO

ARE Copyright Law Alert:Second Circuit Clarifies Digital Millenium Copyright Act’s Safe Harbor Provisions In Viacom International, Inc. v. Youtube, Inc. Decision

ARE Trademark Law Alert:Fourth Circuit Revives Rosetta Stone Case Against Google’s Keyword Searching

ARE Litigation Alert:U.S. Supreme Court Finds Prometheus Method of Diagnosing and/or Treating Unpatentable Law of Nature

Federal circuit grants mandamus on Delaware transfer motion

Abstract

Legal Context

Facts

Analysis

Practical significance

$24 million judgment of wilful infringement affirmed by Federal Circuit

Abstract

Legal Context

Facts

Analysis

Practical significance

ARE Patent Law Alert:The Supreme Court Denies Cert in favor of First Quality

In the Press: TTOs often walk a fine line when negotiating rights to improvements

Brief in Opposition "Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, Inc. and Kimberly-Clark Global Sales, LLC, Petitioners, v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC and First Quality Retail Sercvices, LLC, Respondents, (December 30, 2011)"

ARE Patent Law Alert: First Quality Files Brief In Opposition To Cert Petition With The U.S. Supreme Court

In the Press: K-C Diaper Patent Wiped Out In First Quality IP Suit

In the Press: 'T-minus' Buffet enters the private placement biz

In the Press: Mayo Case Could Clarify Patentability, Expand On Bilski

法改正「先願主義」移行、弁護士に聞く, 日経産業新聞 (Nikkei) - (ONLY AVAILABLE IN JAPANESE)

In the Press: Technology Transfer turns to partner, Charles R. Macedo, for expertise on new patent report law

Practice Note: Patent Infringement Claims and Defenses (Updated for America Invents Act)

Implications of Post-Seagate Cases Finding Willful Infringement

In the Press: Kimberly-Clark Loses Fed. Circ. Rehearing Bid In IP Row

ARE Patent Law Alert:
Federal Circuit Clarifies Recapture Rule For Analysis Of Reissue Claims

ARE Patent Law Alert:
Federal Circuit Finds Patents Unenforceable Under Therasense Standard

ARE Patent Law Alert:
Supreme Court Holds New Evidence Can Be Presented In A Civil Action Brought In District Courts Against The PTO

ARE Copyright Law Alert:
Second Circuit Clarifies Digital Millenium Copyright Act’s Safe Harbor Provisions In Viacom International, Inc. v. Youtube, Inc. Decision

ARE Trademark Law Alert:
Fourth Circuit Revives Rosetta Stone Case Against Google’s Keyword Searching

ARE Litigation Alert:
U.S. Supreme Court Finds Prometheus Method of Diagnosing and/or Treating Unpatentable Law of Nature

ARE Patent Law Alert:
The Supreme Court Denies Cert in favor of First Quality

In the Press:
TTOs often walk a fine line when negotiating rights to improvements

ARE Patent Law Alert:
First Quality Files Brief In Opposition To Cert Petition With The U.S. Supreme Court

In the Press:
K-C Diaper Patent Wiped Out In First Quality IP Suit

In the Press:
'T-minus' Buffet enters the private placement biz

In the Press:
Mayo Case Could Clarify Patentability, Expand On Bilski

In the Press:
Technology Transfer turns to partner, Charles R. Macedo, for expertise on new patent report law

In the Press:
Kimberly-Clark Loses Fed. Circ. Rehearing Bid In IP Row